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Abstract 
In the ‘long eighteenth-century’ British national identity was superimposed over pre-existing 
identities in Britain in order to bring together the somewhat disparate, often warring, states. 
This identity centred on war with France; the French were conceptualised as the ‘other’, 
being seen by the British as both different and inferior. For many historians this identity, built 
in reaction and opposition to France, dissipated following the defeat of Napoleon at Waterloo 
in 1815, as Britain gradually introduced changes that allowed broader sections of the 
population to engage in the political process. A new militaristic identity did not reappear in 
Britain until the 1850s, following the Crimean War and the Indian Mutiny. This identity did 
not fixate on France, but rather saw all foreign nations as different and, consequently, 
inferior. An additional change was the increasing public interest in the army and war, more 
generally. War became viewed as a ‘pleasurable endeavour’ in which Britons had an innate 
skill and the army became seen as representative of that fact, rather than an outlet to dispose 
of undesirable elements of the population, as it had been in the past. British identity became 
increasingly militaristic in the lead up to the First World War. However, these two identities 
have been seen as separate phenomena, rather than the later identity being a progression of 
the earlier construct.  
 
This thesis argues that this militaristic nineteenth-century identity was simply an evolution of 
that which was superimposed a century earlier. A key component, linking the two constructs, 
was the memoirs of the soldiers of the Revolutionary and Napoleonic wars, particularly those 
that served in the Waterloo campaign. Even as the wars were underway, former soldiers were 
releasing their memoirs to a receptive public, thanks to expanding literacy, and this only 
escalated after the final victory at Waterloo. In the 1820s, several memoirs were published 
that achieved an unprecedented level of resonance with the public as they successfully 
presented their wartime experiences as ‘an exciting adventure’ and ‘showed’ that British 
soldiers faced the horrors of war with a ‘cheerful stoicism’. These works helped to establish 
the memoir as an accepted literary genre in Britain.  
 
The public’s enthusiasm for heroic episodes of war allowed the veterans to influence the 
public memory of the campaign. The soldiers’ own experiences led an overwhelming 
majority to conclude that they had more in common with their French enemy than their 
various allies, whether they were civilian or soldier. With respect to Waterloo, this meant that 
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they erroneously portrayed the battle as a British victory, won in spite of the insipid 
performance of the allied combatants. These allied combatants made up of Germans from the 
states of Hanover, Brunswick, Nassau and Prussia, along with troops of the Netherlands, 
which at the time included modern-day Belgium, with a few notable exceptions, provided 
little in the way of defeating the enemy. 
 
Despite the exceeding popularity of memoirs, demonstrating a continuing public interest in 
war, their impact on the views of the British public regarding foreigners was, initially, fairly 
limited. It was only with the advent of secondary literature, and the passing of the generation 
that had direct memories of the Revolutionary and Napoleonic wars, around the middle of the 
century, that the British public began to embrace this memory. As British identity became 
increasingly militaristic and nationalistic, new secondary histories continued to remove the 
allied contingents from the battle, to the point where Waterloo became the final Franco-
British conflict, affirming British supremacy. But whereas in the past British supremacy had 
been measured against France, in the nineteenth-century, the rest of Europe was included in 
this assessment, not just the French. The British viewed themselves as both different from the 
continent and, consequently, superior. The few attempts to redress this perception within the 
Waterloo narrative were vigorously rebuked by military historians in the period.  
 
The memoirs of the military veterans alone did not achieve the objective of reshaping British 
national identity in the nineteenth-century. But they provide an important example of the 
manner in which British national identity was influenced by war and the military in the 
nineteenth-century. They provide a prominent example of the continuing interest of the 
British public in war, even after the long wars with Revolutionary and Napoleonic France. 
Furthermore, they provide the context for the changing view of the ‘other’ from France, as it 
had been in the eighteenth-century, to all foreigners as it became in the nineteenth-century. 
Finally, they help to explain why in much of the English-speaking world the battle of 
Waterloo is viewed as a British victory, rather than an allied one. 
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Introduction 
 
The importance of inter-state warfare and the Napoleonic Wars in the development of British 
national identity has been emphasised by writers since the appearance of Linda Colley’s 
Britons.
1
 For Colley, recurring warfare with France between 1688 and 1815 enabled the 
French to fill the role of the hostile ‘other’ in Britain. With British national identity well-
established by Queen Victoria’s ascension, nineteenth-century Britons are seen as defenders 
of domestic liberty and international peace, at least until 1890 when militarism spread across 
Britain and Europe. This view has been challenged by Michael Paris’ Warrior Nation which 
contends that by the 1850s war had become an acceptable and even pleasurable endeavour in 
British culture.
2
 But interest in war and the military, contrary to most assumptions, never 
really ceased following the victory at Waterloo. It was sustained, in large part, by the 
countless veterans’ memoirs being published. These memoirs played a significant role in 
establishing that France should no longer be the only nation viewed as the external ‘other’, 
directing a greater level of animosity towards Britain’s former allies. This was particularly 
the case for the Waterloo campaign, the most important event in British military history until 
1914. Soldiers’ prejudices were eventually embraced in the historiography of the conflict, 
resulting in Waterloo shifting from an inclusive allied victory to a British victory. Most 
examinations of British historiography, such as Richard Evans Cosmopolitan Islanders, have 
downplayed or ignored military history, leading to a distorted representation of nineteenth-
century British national identity. This thesis intends on addressing the role of military history 
on British national identity with a particular focus on the Waterloo campaign.
3
  
 
Great Britain came into being with the Treaty of Union in 1707, uniting Scotland with 
England and Wales. This established a new state that not only needed to form a new national 
                                               
1
 Linda Colley, Britons: Forging the Nation, 1707-1837, 3
rd
 ed., New Haven, 2009. Colley’s work, first 
published in 1992, explores the origins of British national identity in contrast to the varying identities that had 
previously held sway in Britain before the Union Treaty in 1707. Much credence is given to the role that inter-
state warfare, particularly the wars against France, had on the establishment of this identity and its influence on 
masculinity in eighteenth and nineteenth-century Britain.  
2
 Michael Paris, Warrior Nation: Images of War in British Popular Culture, 1850-2000, Trowbridge, 2000. 
Contrary to most works which argue that nineteenth-century Britain was a peace-loving, commercial nation, this 
work argues that a ‘pleasure culture of war’ has existed in Britain since the 1850s, following the outbreak of the 
Crimean War. This affinity for war has remained a component of British culture right up to the present-day.  
3
 Richard Evans, Cosmopolitan Islanders: British Historians and the European Continent, Cambridge, 2009. 
Evans’ book analyses the influence that British and American historians have had on the study of continental 
Europe in contrast to the historical fraternity of continental Europe who rarely explore the history of nations 
other than their own.  
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identity but assert it over the pre-existing national and regional identities. Linda Colley’s 
Britons argued that Protestantism and war with Catholic France were critical components in 
shaping British national identity over the course of the eighteenth and early nineteenth-
centuries. Protestantism became a uniting factor that differentiated Britain from Catholic 
France, encouraging Britons to view themselves as a chosen people destined to overcome 
their greatest enemy. This conceptualisation was superimposed over other identities in Britain 
and was endorsed and strengthened by the repeated military successes against France during 
‘the long eighteenth-century’. Even the defeat by the American colonies helped strengthen 
this conviction with the rationale being that Britain had grown arrogant trying to impose itself 
against its religious brethren. Repeated conflict with France also helped improve the public 
image of the British Army, particularly the perception of senior commanders. Men such as 
James Wolfe, who was killed commanding the capture of Quebec City in 1759, became 
venerated in Britain.  
 
The conflict with Revolutionary and Napoleonic France would cause some alteration of these 
perceptions as France no longer projected itself as a Catholic power. The protracted conflict 
with a less overtly Catholic enemy, coupled with the earlier failure in the American 
Revolution weakened the influence of Protestantism in Britain. But successes for the army in 
both the Iberian Peninsula and Belgium occasioned a general improvement in its relationship 
with the public. Like Admiral Horatio Nelson, army commanders such as John Moore and 
Arthur Wellesley, the Duke of Wellington, became national heroes. Furthermore the ‘Great 
War’, as it was then known, placed an unprecedented demand on the population, creating 
circumstances highly favourable to the development of a national consciousness.
4
 This 
national consciousness encouraged the population to push for greater civic recognition after 
1815. While initial efforts proved unsuccessful, due to effective government counter-actions, 
later efforts witnessed the successful introduction of Catholic Emancipation, Political Reform 
and the abolition of slavery in Britain, without Revolution, in a four year period. For Colley, 
a British national identity was well-established by Queen Victoria’s ascension in 1837.  
 
While Colley’s work was ground-breaking it was certainly not unique in exploring the 
development of Britain during this period and offering a synthesis. For many historians the 
critical event was the passing of the Reform Act in 1832. E. P Thompson’s The Making of the 
                                               
4
 Prior to the First World War, which until the Second World War was known as the Great War, the 
Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars had been known in Britain as the ‘Great War’. 
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English Working Class is one of the seminal works that explores the development of class in 
Britain in this formative period between 1780 and 1832.
5
 For Thompson this period marked 
the foundation and development of a clear, distinct, politically conscious working-class 
identity amongst the mass of the English population, the so-called “free-born Englishman”. 
This is in contrast to Jonathan Clark whose more conservative analysis extends to the 
Restoration in England in 1660.
6
 Clark felt that there was a gradual erosion of the social, 
religious and political hegemony that existed in England leading to reform in 1832 rather than 
the more dramatic shift argued by Thompson. Harold Perkin was less polarised with his 
narrative of this period, though he continued beyond the Reform Act to 1880.
7
 For these 
works, the key developments were social, religious and political.  
 
While this period of British history had been explored prior to Colley’s work, there was not a 
great deal of interest in nationalism or war. Nationalism, as Hobsbawm argued in his seminal 
work, was a phenomenon that started appearing around 1780 and, for the most part, this was 
accepted.
8
 Gerald Newman argued that nationalism had earlier origins than 1780 in England, 
suggesting that it could be traced back to around 1740, in large part for the English people to 
establish a separate identity from the French.
9
 Meanwhile, John Brewer was one of the few to 
explore the relationship of the English state with war. Brewer noted that between the 
Revolution of 1688 and the American victory in 1783, England was heavily engaged in war; 
progressively demanding more of the nation’s manpower and material resources.10  
 
The situation was strikingly similar for works on Britain in the nineteenth-century. A more 
circumspect analysis then Colley had been previously released by Keith Robbins, who noted 
integration between England, Scotland and Wales, while also acknowledging continuing 
diversity.
11
 His focus was on the social, economic and political processes often linked to 
industrialisation and urbanisation that tend towards cultural homogenization. Religion and 
military conflict are largely ignored. Robbins noted that Britishness is perhaps best measured 
at a more formal level, defending the Colley perspective that it was superimposed but arguing 
that it was not uniform or embraced as strongly on a personal level. There is a general 
                                               
5
 E. P. Thompson, The Making of the English Working Class, Harmondsworth, 1968. 
6
 J. C. D. Clark, English Society 1660-1832, 2
nd
 ed., Cambridge, 2000. 
7
 Harold Perkin, The Origins of Modern English Society, 1780-1880, London, 1969. 
8
 E. J. Hobsbawm, Nations and Nationalism since 1780: program, myth, reality, 2
nd
 ed., Cambridge, 1992. 
9
 Gerald Newman, The Rise of English Nationalism: A Cultural History 1740-1830, London, 1987. 
10
 John Brewer, The Sinews of Power: War, Money and the English State, 1688-1783, New York, 1989. 
11
 Keith Robbins, Nineteenth-Century Britain: Integration and Diversity, Oxford, 1988. 
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acceptance that a British national identity only began to form in the period following 1780 as 
a result of political developments that eventually led to the passing of the Reform Act in 
1832.  
 
The Colley thesis forced a re-evaluation of Britain and nationalism and while it was well-
accepted in some quarters, others were critical. These criticisms, as cited by Chris Williams, 
focus on the elevation of identities and groups that endorse the thesis and dismissal or 
reduction of others that do not.
12
 The conceptualisation of a homogenous Protestant identity 
in Britain has often drawn criticism, with many observing that the work understated the level 
of domestic religious tensions within Protestant groups. A series of essays entitled 
Protestantism and National Identity showed that there were many facets of Protestantism in 
Britain which Colley had understated.
13
 Protestantism, rather than being a uniting force, 
could easily be used, and sometimes acted as a dividing force. Some, like Colin Kidd, argue 
that a sense of North Britishness actually developed around Anglicism rather than British 
nationhood.
14
 He believes that ‘North Britons themselves did much to inhibit the 
development of a comprehensive vision of British nationhood that drew on the history of both 
Scots and English’.15 Nonetheless, these critics did not completely dismiss the entire premise 
of the Colley thesis but merely identified perceived flaws or components that required further 
analysis. As Claydon and McBride point out, ‘it would be as distorting simply to abandon the 
simple model of protestantism and nationality as it would have been to leave it 
unchallenged’.16 
 
Debate around the influence of Protestantism in Britain obviously brought with it questions 
around the role of anti-Catholicism and France as a Catholic ‘other’. Robin Eagles has been 
quite critical of the depiction of Francophobia in eighteenth-century Britain, arguing that this 
                                               
12
 Chris Williams, “British Identities”, in Chris Williams, ed., A Companion to Nineteenth-Century Britain, 
Malden, 2004, p.539. 
13
 Tony Claydon and Ian McBride, eds., Protestantism and National Identity: Britain and Ireland, c.1650-
c.1850, Cambridge, 1998. Another work which looked at the issue of the British Union and the challenge of 
accommodating a variety of identities was Laurence Brockliss and David Eastwood, eds., A Union of multiple 
identities: The British Isles, c. 1750-c. 1850, Manchester, 1997. This collection of essays, though exploring the 
entire century, focuses on the period between the battle of Waterloo and the Crimean War, arguing that it was in 
this period that the fundamental characteristics of the British Union evolved.  
14
 Colin Kidd, “North Britishness and the Nature of Eighteenth-Century British Patriotisms”, The Historical 
Journal 39, 1996. 
15
 Kidd, “North Britishness”, p.364. 
16
 Tony Claydon and Ian McBride, “The trials of the chosen peoples: recent interpretations of protestantism and 
national identity in Britain and Ireland”, in Tony Claydon and Ian McBride, eds., Protestantism and National 
Identity: Britain and Ireland, c.1650-c.1850, Cambridge, 1998, p.26. 
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phenomenon has been overstated, particularly regarding the elites.
17
 Eagles has made little 
headway with this argument as it was mainly the elites who were the Francophiles. A more 
contentious issue has been the lack of engagement with Ireland. While technically only a part 
of Britain from 1801 and predominantly Catholic, Ireland still constituted a significant factor 
in opposition to British national identity. Furthermore the political changes in 1801 did not 
lead to a massive embrace of British identity by the Catholic Irish. This is also an area of 
concern for the Scottish Highlands with their predominantly Catholic population. The 
isolation of the Catholic population is a necessary component of projecting the ‘other’, in the 
form of Catholic France, as the enemy of Britain as well as validating the role of 
Protestantism in fashioning national identity. 
 
The exclusion of Catholic Britons has led to concerns that Colley has inadvertently elevated 
Britishness to the exclusion of other identities because she mistook wartime British rhetoric 
for strong examples of identity. This argument is put forth by J. E. Cookson’s The British 
Armed Nation.
18
 Cookson focuses on topics that he feels were either ignored or 
underexplored including the Scottish and Irish dimensions and their military contributions, 
the role of what he calls national defence patriotism and its contribution to national loyalty 
and the strategic, military and political limitations of the state and society during the wars.
19
 
Moreover Cookson believes that Colley has conflated loyalism and ‘national defence 
patriotism’ during the conflict with Revolutionary and Napoleonic France. Finally, Cookson 
rejects Colley’s argument that the development of a more inclusive identity following this 
conflict was a key component of the political turmoil of the period between the battle of 
Waterloo and the ascendancy of Queen Victoria by stating that ‘few, if any, satisfactory 
connections have been made between Britain’s war experience and subsequent events and 
development’ such as Catholic Emancipation and Political Reform.20 
 
                                               
17
 Robin Eagles, Francophilia in English Society, 1748-1815, Basingstoke, 2000. While Eagles’ work raises 
some interesting points, it ultimately struggles because it fails to extend the Francophilia beyond British elites 
who represented only a small section of the population.  
18
 J. E. Cookson, The British Armed Nation, 1793-1815, London, 1997. This work explores the ‘war and 
society’ history of Britain during the Revolutionary and Napoleonic period.  
19
 Another work that explores the enlistment of Irishmen into the army and the non-Irish militia in that country 
is Catriona Kennedy, Narratives of the Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars: Military and Civilian Experience 
in Britain and Ireland, London, 2013. This work explored the way in which the soldiers, and to a lesser extent 
civilians, contemporaneously depicted the 1793-1815 conflict and the different narratives that developed, 
reflecting the multitude of experiences service personnel encountered. This work in many respects shows the 
complexities of Britishness in this period. 
20
 J. E. Cookson, The British Armed Nation, p.252. 
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Despite these criticisms, Colley’s work remains a standard reference for any work exploring 
British national identity in the nineteenth and twentieth-centuries. This is evident by the 
wealth of works that have utilised her as a foundation. This thesis intends on doing the same 
by exploring the battle of Waterloo and its influence on British national identity in the 
nineteenth and early twentieth-centuries.  
 
The battle of Waterloo was the climatic point in the short 1815 campaign which marked the 
end of the Napoleonic era in Europe. The French army under Napoleon was comprehensively 
defeated by the effective combination of a Prussian army under Field Marshal Blücher and a 
conglomerate army of British, King’s German Legion, Hanoverian, Brunswicker, Nassauer, 
Belgian and Netherlander units under the Duke of Wellington. The initial belief for many of 
combatants on the morning following the battle was that it marked the costly opening 
exchanges in a long campaign. Despite early foreboding, it quickly became apparent that the 
long wars that had plagued a generation were finally over. In Britain, the fascination with the 
battle reached a level that had not been achieved by the earlier successful campaigns in the 
Iberian Peninsula or Egypt. All who served at Waterloo, including the rank and file, received 
a medal for their service and the Duke of Wellington left the army to pursue what turned out 
to be a rather contentious political career. Embitterment from veterans of other campaigns, 
many who saw far more combat than most at Waterloo, eventually led to a General Service 
Medal being introduced for all participants who served from 1793-1814, with clasps to 
signify battles.
21
 Nonetheless Waterloo would remain the pre-eminent reference point for 
public remembrance of the Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars.   
 
A significant amount of research has been conducted into the various ways in which 
Waterloo was remembered in nineteenth-century Britain. Some like Stuart Semmel have 
focused on British tourism and collecting in the initial post-Waterloo period and how these 
artefacts and the battlefield contributed to the public’s ability to connect to the conflict.22 
Others, like Philip Shaw and J.R Watson, explore the Romantic literature that developed both 
                                               
21
 Kevin Pryor, The Mobilization of Memory: The Battle of Waterloo in German and British Memory, 1815-
1915, PhD dissertation, Southern Illinois University, 2010, p28. 
22
 Stuart Semmel, “Reading the Tangible Past; British Tourism, Collecting, and Memory After Waterloo,’ 
Representations 69, 2000. Other works that have looked at military iconography and cultural patriotism more 
broadly in this period include J. W. M. Hichberger, Images of the Army: The Military in British Art, 1815-1914, 
Manchester, 1988 and Holger Hoock, The King’s Artists: The Royal Academy of Arts and the Politics of British 
Culture 1760-1840, Oxford, 2004. 
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during the wars and in the period after their successful conclusion.
23
 Elisa Milkes has 
demonstrated the impact economic structures had on channelling ‘people’s memories of the 
past’ in the post-Waterloo period.24  
 
More recently Kevin Pryor has argued that the memory of Waterloo in Britain developed in 
three overlapping stages.
25
 The first period from 1815 to the 1850s cemented a popular 
narrative in the public consciousness that depicted Wellington as the paternalistic saviour. 
This for contemporary Britons was validated by their global hegemony. From the 1850s to 
the 1870s this memory was destabilised by Britain’s declining global pre-eminence. 
Consequently efforts were made to recast the myth as a more universal conflict, rather than 
one against France, to suit a changing world. Pryor concludes that these arguments paid 
dividends in the late Victorian and Edwardian periods as the middle-class culture embraced 
the chivalry and militaristic nationalism of earlier conceptions of Waterloo. While less anti-
French then previous representations, it had become more hero-worshipping and militantly 
British.
26
 Alan Forrest has also put forth many of the arguments maintained by Pryor in in his 
work Great Battles: Waterloo.
27
 His work argues that it was only Britain that saw Waterloo 
as part of the national story and an event worth commemorating, their allies being less 
engaged in the process of memorialising Waterloo.  
 
The problem for both Pryor and Forrest is their failure to look at the evolution of the military 
history of the battle in the nineteenth-century. A focus on public memorialisation has led to 
an ignorance or dismissal of the serious disputes that developed in the mid-nineteenth-century 
between the allied states over their contribution to the campaign’s success. Milkes, Pryor and 
Forrest all acknowledge that the Prussians disputed British claims and that there were 
problems with the British depiction. Problematically, these works focus on the supposed feud 
                                               
23
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24
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25
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26
 Pryor, The Mobilization of Memory, p.18. 
27
 Alan Forrest, Great Battles: Waterloo, Oxford, 2015. Forrest’s work looks at how Waterloo was remembered 
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between Wellington and William Siborne, as depicted in Peter Hofschröer’s rather 
troublesome work Wellington’s Smallest Victory.28 William Siborne released an enormous, 
and highly detailed, model of the battle of Waterloo in 1838. Six years later he released a 
two-volume history of the campaign. While the model showed a significant Prussian 
contribution, this was later removed from both the model and the history. Peter Hofschröer 
believes that the Duke of Wellington orchestrated a conspiracy against Siborne to prevent the 
British public from discovering the significant Prussian contribution to victory in 1815. This 
is in spite of the wealth of contradictory evidence to the claims of a conspiracy that will be 
presented in chapters three and four of this work. Furthermore, this has led to an ignorance, 
or dismissal in the case of Hofschröer, of the hostile reaction against Siborne’s work in both 
the Netherlands and Belgium, which had nothing to do with Wellington.
29
  
 
Not only are their problems with Hofschröer’s analysis, but he presumes the post-1815 
British public had embraced a national memory of the campaign that excluded non-British 
contributions. This has been readily accepted by these listed works and is fundamentally 
flawed. Overwhelming evidence, discussed in chapter three, illustrates that while most 
Britons in this period embraced the memory of Waterloo as an inspiring national display of 
arms, this was not at the expense of the allied armies. This attitude would only shift following 
the publication of Siborne’s work.  
 
Siborne, though providing the necessary context for the shift in the public view of Waterloo, 
does not deserve full responsibility for its development. In many respects, he was reacting to 
a section of the community with a vested interest, namely veteran officers of Waterloo. To 
construct his work Siborne contacted hundreds of these men, predominantly from the British 
army, creating the so-called Siborne Letters. To this he added letters from some of the 
German officers in Wellington’s army, as well as engaging in correspondence with the 
Prussians. While attempts at engaging the French were rebuffed, Netherlander and Belgian 
officers, other than the Prince of Orange, were not contacted. While a number of British 
officers were generous in their praise to the allied troops the vast majority were highly 
                                               
28
 Peter Hofschröer, Wellington’s Smallest Victory: The Duke, the Model Maker and the Secret of Waterloo, 
London, 2005. 
29
 Hofschröer, Wellington’s Smallest Victory, p.110. Hofschröer briefly mentions this ‘acrimonious affair’ in his 
book. He provided more detail on this debate in an internet article. Numerous publications were written in both 
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critical. Criticism in the letters usually depicted foreign cowardice, incompetence or 
negligible impact on proceedings and helped to endorse many of the claims in veterans’ 
memoirs published before Siborne’s work. While Siborne’s original display of the model in 
1838 challenged some of these claims, by the time he wrote his history six years later he 
largely endorsed the prejudice of these troops.  
 
From this point in time British writing on Waterloo became increasingly nationalistic to the 
point that Waterloo became, at least in the English-speaking world, a battle in which Britain 
proved its martial supremacy over its old enemy. Even when William Siborne’s son 
published some of the letters in 1891 he was selective with the one’s he chose. Denigration of 
the non-British formations would only begin to be revised in 1993, when David Hamilton-
Williams released Waterloo: The Great Battle Reappraised.
30
 This work challenged many 
accepted ‘truths’ of Waterloo, but as a revisionist work it also attracted its fair share of 
criticism. However, others were keen to add their own contributions to the history of 
Waterloo. Hamilton-Williams was followed by Peter Hofschröer, whose two-volume work 
1815: The Waterloo Campaign, probably still stands as the definitive work on the German 
contribution.
31
 While criticised for its unfair assaults on Wellington and its overly aggressive 
defence of the Prussians, Hofschröer makes a robust and highly engaging case for the 
Germans (Prussians, Hanoverians, Brunswickers and Nassauers) to be viewed as the victors 
at Waterloo. As he observes, overall 75% of the Allied troops during the campaign were 
German, with a little over 10% being British.  
 
These new works initiated a period of growing interest in Waterloo that had been absent since 
the commencement of the First World War. While a few works had been written in that time, 
most were written by non-academic historians, who simply restated the thesis that had been 
dominant prior to 1914, although the Prussians received some rehabilitation in light of the 
reduction in Anglo-German hostility following the Second World War. Of the new works that 
did appear, some like Brendan Simms tried to be provocative.
 32
 Others narrowed their focus 
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31
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32
 Brendan Simms, The Longest Afternoon: The 400 Men who Decided the Battle of Waterloo, London, 2014 
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to particular formations, there being a particular interest in the much-maligned Dutch-Belgian 
contingent.
33
 Andrew Field was more intrigued by the French source material, especially that 
written by those other than Napoleon and his marshals that had often served to accentuate 
British prowess.
34
 
 
While some were conducting their own analyses, others simply decided to publish previously 
unused primary sources, including translated material. John Franklin released translated 
material from the Netherlands and Hanoverian contingent.
35
 Meanwhile Gareth Glover 
progressively released a wealth of previously ignored material, beginning with the Siborne 
Letters not published by William Siborne’s son in 1891. This included correspondence with 
German veterans.
36
 This was followed by six volumes of The Waterloo Archive which 
contained a mass of letters, documents, after battle reports and various other important and 
largely unknown documents.
37
 While four volumes were from British sources, two were 
made up of material from the often neglected German troops in Wellington’s army. 
Unfortunately Glover’s narrative of the campaign, envisioned as a dispelling of long held 
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 André Dellevoet, The Dutch-Belgian Cavalry at Waterloo, The Hague, 2008 focused solely on the 
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Waterloo Archive: German Sources Vol. 2, Translated from German by Martin Mittelacher, Barnsley, 2010; 
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myths, lacked adequate source material from French, Dutch-Belgian, and Prussian sources to 
make any serious contribution.
38
  
 
Despite this wave of new material that challenged the standard Waterloo narrative, it was still 
very common to see the British military epic in print. This included works by academic 
historians. Andrew Roberts’ Waterloo: June 18, 1815, The Battle for Modern Europe,39 
depicted the battle as a not only a duel between the two generals and their armies, but as a 
representation of the differences and animosity between the two nations. Roberts does make 
the pertinent point that ‘just as it is an absurd question to ask whether Wellington could have 
won Waterloo without Blücher – because he never would have fought the battle – so it is 
equally pointless to consider a battle fought without the Dutch and Belgian contingents.’40 
However, his work does little to show this and he even makes the bizarre claim that the 
Netherlands troops were not, among other reasons, ‘racially’ invested in the fight.41  
 
Jeremy Black’s The Battle of Waterloo: A New History argued that allied success depended 
less on Wellington’s military genius than his being a product of the system around him.42 The 
premise of the argument relies on a dismissal of the allied contingents, who are once again 
treated as inexperienced and largely insignificant. The reality was that many non-British 
commanders were highly experienced after long service in the Napoleonic system. More 
recently, Gregory Fremont-Barnes in response to the many works on other national 
contingents, decided to review the role of the British troops.
43
 Disappointingly, Fremont-
Barnes chose the title British Army’s Day of Destiny and it would be fair to say that he did 
little to repudiate the national epic popularised in the late nineteenth-century. This primarily 
stemmed from a failure to adequately utilise non-British source material to provide a more 
objective analysis.  
 
Despite more than twenty years of revisionism, the publication of works that perpetuate the 
nationalist narrative in British campaign histories demonstrates its continuing influence. But 
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even a rudimentary review of the contemporary newspapers following the victory in 1815 
illustrate that there was almost no animosity to sharing the victory with their allies. At this 
time Waterloo was an Allied victory in which the British had performed exceedingly well.  
However, by 1900, in a revisionist article about the Netherlands contingent, Sir Herbert 
Maxwell made the point that ‘nine Englishmen out of ten think of Waterloo as a purely 
British victory, in which the army of the King of Prussia figures, if it figures at all, as a 
merely subsidiary fact, and consider the whole campaign as a triumph of British strategy and 
valour, wherein the Netherlander contingent in Wellington’s army acted a negligible and 
even an injurious part.’44 Maxwell’s attempt to revise the narrative was met with open 
contempt by the premier military historian of the age, Sir Charles Oman, illustrating how 
entrenched the history had become.  
 
The development of a nationalist Waterloo narrative in Britain contradicts the generally 
prevailing view that war had a limited impact on British national identity in the nineteenth-
century. Many of the works that employ the Colley thesis as grounding for their analysis of 
nineteenth-century Britain tend to draw away from war, focusing instead on political, social 
and economic developments.
45
 Colley, for the most part, seems to agree with this sentiment 
as her work when reviewing developments after Waterloo focuses on the political turmoil in 
Britain relating to Catholic Emancipation, the Reform Act and Slavery Act. It is not 
surprising given that the Crimean War with Russia was the only conflict Britain engaged in 
with a European power until 1914.  Colonial wars did continue unabated during much of this 
period but much of this has been seen as a reflection of imperialism rather than inter-state 
war. For the majority of historians of nineteenth-century Britain, war is distant, affecting only 
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a small segment of the population. A militaristic culture only begins to emerge in the 1890s, 
as Britain became increasingly threatened from German imperial and military expansion.  
 
Some explanation for this view is provided by Richard Evans in Cosmopolitan Islanders, 
when he argues that the French Revolution and the ‘long series of wars with France, and at 
times, much of the rest of the continent’ helped forge a ‘specifically British national 
consciousness and identity’.46 In Britain, Europe became a definable ‘other’,47 encouraging 
‘British historians to investigate its past as if they were investigating the past of some strange 
and remote foreign land’.48 Evans accepts the role of war in shaping a British national 
identity but regards nineteenth-century attitudes toward Europe as being shaped by curiosity 
and objectivity, not animosity. He also notes that in the second-half of the nineteenth-century 
the British historical fraternity began to adopt the ideas of professional history as they were 
established by the Germans.
49
  
 
It is reasonable to say, as Evans does, that nineteenth-century British historians maintained a 
strong interest in the French Revolution, at least until 1870 when interested shifted eastwards 
following the formation of Germany.  But like their European counterparts the most well-
known national historians ‘whether opposing empires or legitimating existing or aspiring 
nation states … were busy providing historical master narratives’.50 Evans acknowledges that 
much of the British historiography of the French Revolution acted to strengthen the British 
nationalist conviction of being a protector of liberty, the so-called Whig Interpretation of 
History as it was later coined by Herbert Butterfield.
51
 The writing of history, as Berger 
points out, was not simply an academic activity, it was a public project, and in the nineteenth-
century national histories were most effective at fulfilling this function.
52
 While national 
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history for some countries was about validating their right to exist, for Britain it was about 
justifying why they were and deserved to remain pre-eminent.  
 
War and military history operated in this fashion too and the history of conflict often serviced 
this most effectively in an era shaped by nationalism. Military history offered the opportunity 
for Britain to justify its claims to pre-eminence in the period. But it also allowed Britain to 
establish difference between itself and the other nations of Europe. British troops would often 
be lauded while the allied troops who fought with them were often ridiculed or ignored in 
these works. This helped to establish the rest of Europe, not just France as the ‘other’, and 
consequently inferior. In actual fact, the French were often depicted more generously than 
any of Britain’s allies. Evans has overlooked the role of military history, partly because in 
Britain at least, this history was not written by academics. But this history was influential in 
Britain because it was being published for and read by the general public on a greater scale 
than many academic histories.  
 
While it has remained an underexplored topic, since the Colley thesis was published a 
number of works have come forward exploring the relationship of nineteenth-century Britain 
with war. Graham Dawson released a psychoanalytical and historical analysis of the creation 
and development of the military adventure in Britain and its associations with masculinity.
53
 
This, in his estimation, can be traced as far back to the Indian Mutiny of 1857. Dawson also 
coined the phrase ‘pleasure culture of war’ to describe the commercialisation of war in 
British society that he marks as beginning in the 1890s. Building on this work and the phrase 
‘pleasure culture of war’, Michael Paris has shown, rather than developing in the 1890s, and 
shaping Britain in the lead up to the First World War, the idea of war being an enjoyable or 
pleasurable national endeavour developed in Britain during the Crimean War.
54
 He further 
concludes that this national interest still exists even today. However, Paris also acknowledges 
that this positive relationship with war can be seen even earlier. Even as Britain dealt with 
war-weariness and the massive gains from the wars after 1815, it was still busy expanding its 
empire.
55
 A mass public interest, and even fascination, with war would only grow as war-
weariness began to wane during the 1830s. 
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One aspect of this burgeoning public interest in war that has been underexplored is the 
military memoir. This new literary genre became exceedingly popular after the Revolutionary 
and Napoleonic wars. Countless memoirs were published, even as the war was going on, and 
that continued in the post-Waterloo period. These memoirists benefitted both from the 
expanding literacy of the working-class population, with two-thirds being literate by 1830, 
and a continuance of a strong public interest in the recent wars.
56
 Neil Ramsey has shown that 
by 1823 the memoir was a viable literary genre in Britain.
57
 His research further demonstrates 
that the memoirs that enjoyed the most success in Britain were not those caught up in the 
melancholy of combat but those that revelled in it. War for a British soldier was to be 
endured with a ‘cheerful stoicism’ with most Britons believed to have an innate ability at its 
execution. The most popular works of the period enjoyed such success that multiple editions 
were published to satiate the demands of the British reading public.  
 
This was a significant development because for the first time following a war, the British 
public memory was being shaped by the men who had actually served. Most historians have 
tended to ignore this aspect of the memoirs instead utilising them to contribute to military 
histories when appropriate. One that explored this topic is Gavin Daly’s The British Soldier 
in the Peninsular War which conducted a comprehensive analysis of the letters, diaries and 
memoirs of the officers and men who served in the Peninsula.
58
 One observation he made 
was the soldiers’ propensity to find more in common with their French enemy than their 
allied counterparts. While British civilians saw the French as the enemy or the ‘other’ this 
was not the case for servicemen. Many actually found their allies more contemptible, and saw 
more in common with the French.
59
 First-hand British accounts from the Waterloo campaign 
illustrate that despite operating with a new set of allies, and a new civilian population, the 
attitudes of the majority of servicemen were unchanged. The popularity of these memoirs 
allowed them to influence public memory of the war and provide a viable context for the 
population to view other nations as militarily and culturally inferior to themselves. The early 
nineteenth-century view of the French as the ‘other’ evolved over the course of the century as 
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Britons were increasingly exposed to the view that not only France, but any foreign nation 
was the ‘other’ and consequently inferior to Britain.  
 
This thesis will show how British national identity became increasingly nationalistic 
throughout the nineteenth-century by building on the work of Linda Colley and the memory 
of the Revolutionary and Napoleonic wars. The first chapter will establish the context of the 
thesis by providing a narrative of the Waterloo campaign using available source material 
more objectively. The second chapter will explore the impact of Waterloo and the 
Revolutionary and Napoleonic wars more broadly on the British political and societal 
developments of the post-1815 era and the shaping of national identity in the early 
nineteenth-century. The third chapter will show how these changes to national identity 
actually affected the developing public memory of the Waterloo campaign. The public’s 
interest in veterans’ memoirs exposed them to a prejudice towards their nation’s former allies 
that superseded the anti-French hysteria that gripped the nation during the wars. The final 
chapter will show how war increasingly became seen as a pleasurable endeavour in Britain in 
the second half of the nineteenth-century, as war correspondents depicted British conflicts as 
heroic, necessary and entertaining. The exposure to these attitudes allowed the public to fully 
embrace the nationalisation of the history of Waterloo as it was represented in the secondary 
literature. These depictions were vindicated by veterans’ memoirs and sustained by the 
increasing application of ‘scientific’ constructs in history. By 1914, while war with Germany 
was being enthusiastically received by many Britons, the history of the Waterloo campaign 
had truly become a British heroic epic.  
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Chapter 1 – Waterloo Revisited 
 
This chapter, using relevant primary and secondary literature, is intended to document the 
extent of the allied and British participation in the Waterloo campaign, providing the 
necessary context for the rest of the thesis.   
1
 
The French invasion 
The Waterloo campaign began in earnest at approximately 3:00am on June 15, 1815 as the 
French vanguard crossed the Sambre River and engaged the Prussian outposts at Thuin. As 
per their orders in case of a full-scale invasion, the Prussians slowly withdrew, aiming to 
delay the French to provide time for the Allied armies to assemble.
2
 Prussian I Corps 
commander General Zieten sent a letter to his commander Marshal Blücher sometime before 
5:00am, informing him of the developing situation. The closest Anglo-Allied troops to this 
                                               
1
 The dispositions of the three armies on the night of June 14-15, 1815. Archibald Frank Becke, 1911 
Encyclopaedia Britannica 28, Cambridge, 1911, p.372. Accessed 
https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/e/ee/EB1911-28-0327-a-
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2
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engagement, commanded by Prince William of Orange, were made aware of this combat at 
around 8am. However, as current information was little more than rumour, and border clashes 
had become quite common, full-scale assembly seemed premature. However the Prince of 
Orange’s command post remained on alert. Upon the Prince’s arrival in Brussels at 3pm he 
informed the Duke of these rumours, but no new orders were deemed necessary.    
 
The French continued to push back the Prussians holding Thuin and Lobbes on the border 
and moved on Charleroi. However the tenacity of the Prussian defence surprised the French 
and whilst superior numbers forced withdrawals, the French planned schedule for operations 
was being pushed further and further back. This was not helped by poor French staff work.
3
 
Between 8 and 9am General Zieten compiled two letters, the first for Blücher, the second for 
Wellington, informing them of the situation.
4
 The French, after taking Charleroi, split their 
forces in two. Marshal Ney, commanding the smaller left wing of about 48,000 men, was 
ordered to the crossroads at Les Quatre Bras, whilst Napoleon commanding the right wing 
and reserve, consisting of around 80,000 men, headed to Fleurus and Ligny. Marshal Ney 
was ordered to prevent the Anglo-Allied army from joining with the Prussians, while 
Napoleon intended to bring the Prussians to battle and destroy them.  
 
The Prussians were quick to respond to the situation with Blücher’s chief-of-staff General 
von Gneisenau actually ordering the concentration of their forces the previous evening, 
fearing imminent conflict. Zieten was ordered to ‘observe every movement of the enemy so 
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as to recognise the direction and strength of his columns’.5 By 11am, Blücher had decided to 
concentrate his army at Sombreffe, requesting that Zieten not fall back any further than 
Fleurus, near Ligny,
6
 dispatching a letter at 1pm to Wellington informing him of their 
situation.
7
 Despite their activity, II and III Prussian Corps were delayed in assembling, only 
getting to what would become the Ligny battlefield at 10am and midday on the sixteenth, 
although well in time for the battle. However, IV Corps under General Bülow would never 
arrive, a result of both Gneisenau failing to convey the urgency of the situation and Bülow 
being, according to historian Peter Hofschröer ‘deliberately awkward and obtuse’.8 In spite of 
these setbacks, at Ligny, Napoleon’s 63,000 men would be outnumbered by nearly 84,000 
Prussians.  
 
Incoming reports greatly concerned Netherlands commanders and full assembly for their 
troops near the border was initiated by the Prince’s chief-of-staff General Constant-
Rebecque. Troops from the Netherlands 2
nd
 Division first engaged the French at 3pm, 
eventually being pushed back to their brigade at Les Quatre Bras around 8pm. They stopped 
the French cavalry at that point, and French requests to Marshal Ney for infantry support 
were denied. The Netherlands divisional commander, General Perponcher, was informed at 
9pm that this brigade was ‘too weak to hold out here for long’.9 Perponcher ordered this unit 
to defend the position resolutely and ‘only withdraw if attacked by very superior forces’, 
while he prepared to move additional troops there early the next morning.
10
 However when 
Wellington became aware of the situation, only around 6pm upon receiving the 9am letter 
from General Zieten, he ordered their withdrawal to Nivelles. Fearing this withdrawal would 
allow the French to take Quatre Bras unmolested and threaten the Prussians, Perponcher, with 
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the tacit agreement of Constant-Rebecque, decided to ignore this order, holding on to Les 
Quatre Bras and reinforcing it the next morning with the other brigade from his division.
11
  
12
 
The Battle of Quatre Bras 
Throughout the morning of the sixteenth troops across Belgium began either to march or 
prepare for battle. However, aside from some minor skirmishing between both forces, little 
action was seen until 2pm, when Marshal Ney launched nearly 15,000 infantry and cavalry 
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and 34 guns against 8,000 Netherlands infantry and 16 guns under the Prince of Orange.
13
 
Ney also ordered to his position the division of Jerome Bonaparte, the largest in the French 
army, less than an hour away. However, while initially giving up ground on their left, the 
Netherlands troops dug in around the Gemioncourt farmhouse in the centre and the French 
tirailleurs sent forward failed to dislodge these troops, while cavalry assaults were seen off 
with heavy French casualties.
14
 By 3pm the line had remained essentially where it had been 
thirty minutes earlier, however with many young French, Dutch and Belgian troops now 
casualties. However, the situation was exceedingly desperate for the allies as the French 
severely outnumbered them.  
 
This point marked the arrival of both the Duke of Wellington and a brigade of Netherlands 
light cavalry. Needing to buy time for the cavalry to deploy, the Netherlands infantry were 
ordered to advance. However, while initially successful in pushing the French back, they 
were overwhelmed by superior numbers and in the resulting confusion attacked and routed by 
French cavalry.
15
 In the space of five minutes more than 200 men became casualties and the 
centre almost collapsed. At this stage Jerome Bonaparte’s troops arrived and began attacking 
the, mainly, Nassauers in the Bossu Forest on the allied right, pushing them back through the 
woods.
16
 This freed up French troops to attack the crumbling centre. However, the allies were 
also reinforced by the division of General Picton.
17
 Needing to release the pressure on the 
infantry and provide Picton time to deploy, a Dutch cavalry regiment was ordered forward to 
delay the French. This was not executed well and they were routed by French cavalry, 
devastating the supporting artillery and remaining infantry.
18
 Only the Netherlands troops 
held in reserve and some Scottish troops held the crossroads. In desperation, the remaining 
regiment of Netherlands cavalry, a Belgian unit, was ordered forward. The commander 
skilfully ordered his units forward. At this point a prolonged cavalry swordfight developed 
between the two sides as each vied for supremacy.
19
 Eventually the Netherlands cavalry 
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withdrew, but not before the allies had been able to reinforce their position at the 
crossroads.
20
  
 
The casualties sustained by all three arms of the Netherlands army in the opening hours of the 
battle had been substantial, but their performance had provided the necessary time for Picton 
to deploy his men. The majority of Picton’s men were deployed to the under-defended 
eastern (left) side of the Allied line and while the troops in the centre had been battered the 
position held. Picton’s experienced units began to assault the French right flank and while 
they could not recapture Piraumont, they held on to Thyle, proving a thorn in the French 
side.
21
 Picton’s men were followed, at around 4pm, by the Brunswickers, with the troops, 
mostly, sent to reinforce their allies struggling in and around the Bossu Forest.
22
 The French 
launched a new assault, but Picton’s men charged into their flank. Their success forced the 
French cavalry to divert units to support their infantry but British officers, in particular, paid 
a high price for this success.
23
 Meanwhile the Brunswickers strengthened the allied defence 
and pushed the French in the forest back, temporarily removing this threat to the crossroads.
24
 
By 4:30pm, despite a significant section of the Netherlands force being hors du combat the 
Allies had finally stabilised the front, although Gemioncourt was still in French hands.  
 
The situation did not seem bleak for Marshal Ney because d’Erlon’s French Corps was 
expected to arrive around 5pm. In anticipation, he ordered an aggressive assault by his 
remaining infantry and pushed the Allies back, retaking more of the Bossu wood. However, 
unbeknownst to Ney, at 4pm d’Erlon received an order from Napoleon to come to Ligny to 
deliver the coup de grace upon the Prussians.
25
 By the time Ney learnt of this, the troops had 
been heading to Ligny for more than an hour. Enraged, Ney ordered his immediate return but 
by then d’Erlon was too far from Quatre Bras to affect the battle. Ney’s men were on their 
own. Meanwhile, another British division arrived, and began to make their presence felt as 
                                               
20
 These withdrawing cavalrymen would be shot at by the British troops who had recently arrived, due to the 
similarity of their uniform to the French. Friendly fire would be a continuing problem for both sides, but 
particularly Wellington’s multi-uniformed army, throughout the battles.  
21
 Mike Robinson, The Battle of Quatre Bras, Stroud, 2010, pp.214-218, 241-242, 251. 
22
 August von Herzberg in Gareth Glover, ed., The Waterloo Archive: German Sources Vol. V, Translated from 
German by Martin Mittelacher, Barnsley, 2013, p.149. 
23
 One unit had their square entered by cavalry; however their composure resulted in the horsemen being 
captured inside the square and killed. Robinson, Quatre Bras p.251-252, 262-265. 
24
 Hofschröer, Battles of Ligny and Quatre Bras, p.294. 
25
 Field, Quatre Bras, p.149. 
British National Identity and the Battle for Waterloo Kyle van Beurden 
 
23 
 
Wellington now had numerical superiority. Some were sent to assist Picton, but most 
reinforced the troops in the Bossu Forest and the centre.
26
  
 
In desperation, Ney used his only fresh division, the cavalry of Kellerman, to assault the 
Allies, while an infantry division launched a supporting assault. Despite the apparent futility 
of this charge, the cavalry actually succeeded in overwhelming a British battalion, taking 
their colours.
27
 In addition, during this time the Duke of Brunswick was killed. However, the 
French attacks on other British regiments failed and the cavalry could not hold the ground 
they had taken. By 6:45pm the Allied centre was saved. With the arrival of the British Guards 
around this time, and shortly after Kruse’s Nassauers, Wellington went on the offensive. 
British units took Gemioncourt, the Brunswickers took Piraumont and the wood was 
completely taken by a mixture of units. Estimates for casualties usually consist of 
approximately 4,000 Frenchmen and 4,800 Anglo-Allied soldiers.
28
 At 9pm, with light fading 
and the battle dying down, the Allies held the field but Ney had prevented their joining the 
Prussians at Ligny.  
 
The Battle of Ligny 
At about 2:30pm, approximately fifteen kilometres away from Les Quatre Bras, the combat 
between the French and Prussians began as the French advanced against St Amand, the 
western point of the Prussian position. The Prussians had selected the villages, from west to 
east as their main defensive positions because, as Peter Hofschröer observes, ‘young, 
inexperienced, but enthusiastic Prussian militiamen were more suited to street fighting where 
the better training of the French would be of less advantage.’29 As the French advanced they 
eventually came across Prussians holding St Amand and the hamlet of St Amand La Haye. 
The battle was quite furious, caused by both sides deploying their artillery, and while in the 
first half hour the French took St Amand with small loss, the battle bogged down into a 
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stalemate as they pushed on to the hamlet. However the French, despite tenacious Prussian 
rebuffs, with better use of their reserves, were finally able to take the position around 4pm.
30
  
 
As a result of this, Blücher ordered more units into the slaughter. Reinforced, the Prussians 
again removed the French from the hamlet and most of St Amand, but could not take the 
farmhouse. They were forced to withdraw when French cavalry were sent in to assist their 
beleaguered comrades. French reinforcements restored the situation and by 5pm the French 
held St Amand and the hamlet.
31
 Meanwhile at Ligny, the French assault began at 3pm. 
Initially, the French fared poorly, being driven from the position. Altering their tactics, they 
were able to slowly grind their way through. The French capture of St Amand at 5pm allowed 
for more artillery support to move forward and the French managed to capture most of Ligny, 
with the exception of the chateau and a section held by a Prussian regiment.
32
 During this 
time, further east, Tongrinne had remained relatively quiet, with small skirmishes being the 
order of the day. This all benefitted Napoleon who wanted only to contain the Prussians there 
so he could focus his attention on the western part of the battlefield.  
 
Following on from these successes, at around 5pm the Emperor reinforced his offensive to 
the west with a Young Guard Division and cavalry to help maintain contact with Ney’s wing. 
However the Prussians used this time to launch an assault on both St Amand and Ligny. The 
ferocity of the assault can be gauged from a Prussian participant who later wrote ‘pardon was 
neither asked nor given’.33 Their assault once again proved successful, and they took most of 
Ligny, along with St Amand and St Amand La Haye. However, in their euphoria, the 
Prussians advanced too far at both locations, being subjected to fire from French artillery at 
St Amand and infantry hiding in the tall crops at Ligny. The Prussian success was short-lived. 
By 6pm the French had once again retaken St Amand, St Amand La Haye and most of Ligny.  
 
Napoleon had planned at this point to throw in the reserve and the Imperial Guard to deliver 
the coup de grace. However, a large force appeared in Napoleon’s rear. Not knowing its 
identity, the Emperor delayed his plans for nearly an hour in order to work out to whom this 
force belonged.
34
 The Prussians used this apparent pause to launch a new assault on both 
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positions, desperately seeking to arrest French gains. By this stage the battle had devolved 
into a grinding attritional contest. However, the better husbanding of resources and higher 
quality troops was allowing Napoleon to overcome his numerical inferiority.
35
 The Prussian 
assaults, though successful in retaking St Amand and parts of Ligny, were draining their 
available resources. Meanwhile at Tongrinne, events finally started to heat up as the 
Prussians attacked the French positions. Fighting here also became attritional, as Tongrinne 
and Boignée changed hands several times.
36
  
 
It was not until 7pm that this force in the French rear was discovered to be that of d’Erlon, 
which had appeared further south than expected. However, this freed up the French for one 
final push. While most of Napoleon’s reserves had been engaged, he still maintained the 
Imperial Guard, which he decided to send towards Ligny. While the Prussians had proven 
harder to dislodge from St Amand, they had nearly lost Ligny by around 8:30pm. Napoleon 
diverted troops from St Amand to Ligny which induced Blücher to send more troops to St 
Amand to remove the French there entirely, playing into Napoleon’s hands. With light 
fading, the Imperial Guard delivered the coup de grace decimating the Prussians at Ligny and 
threatening to encircle the Prussians fighting around St Amand.
37
 Blücher personally led 
cavalry charges, trying to provide time for the spent Prussian units to withdraw. He was 
wounded when his horse was shot.  
 
Unfortunately for the French, d’Erlon’s Corps, despite being near the battlefield, had received 
an order from Ney to return to Les Quatre Bras. Despite the impossibility of returning before 
nightfall, d’Erlon split his force up, sending parts in both directions. Still those that did arrive 
at Ligny did not get involved, strangely failing to seek orders from the Emperor.
38
  Without 
additional troops the French could not destroy the Prussians. Nonetheless, Prussian casualties 
were high and an additional 8,000 deserted via Liege further east.
39
 Despite the setback, the 
majority of the troops managed to reach Tilly, as per Gneisenau’s orders, who took charge in 
the absence of Blücher. Many men continued onto Wavre. Meanwhile Blücher was rescued 
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and eventually met up with Gneisenau just beyond Tilly. Including the 8,000 deserters, the 
Prussians sustained around 20,000 casualties. The French lost more than 10,000 men.
40
 The 
French commanded the field but in their exhaustion did not vigorously pursue the defeated 
Prussians. Ultimately Napoleon had defeated the Prussians but had failed to annihilate them 
as an effective fighting force.  
 
The Retreat to Wavre and Mont St. Jean 
The engagements on the seventeenth were relatively low key, in comparison to the two days 
either side, but they had critical strategic consequences. The Prussians continued their retreat 
to Wavre, while Wellington, upon being made aware of the Prussian defeat and subsequent 
withdrawal, decided to withdraw to Mont St Jean. This would prevent his being outflanked 
by the French. Lord Uxbridge, successfully, though according to one subordinate somewhat 
rashly, provided cover for this manoeuvre.
41
 In this he was greatly assisted by the torrential 
downpour which hindered the French pursuit. But the French were also noticeably lethargic.
42
 
Not until 11am did Napoleon dispatch Marshal Grouchy, with around 33,000 men, to pursue 
the Prussians. The remainder of his force at Ligny was diverted to Quatre Bras to support 
Ney. Napoleon anticipated that it would take several days for the Prussians to fully recover 
and ordered Grouchy to destroy them or at least prevent their union with Wellington. But 
Grouchy had trouble locating them, in part because the 8,000 deserters were heading in the 
opposite direction.
43
 French difficulties allowed the Prussians to reorder themselves and when 
the Duke of Wellington asked for one Prussian Corps as reinforcement to stand against 
Napoleon, Blücher promised him his entire army.  
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44
 
The Battle of Waterloo 
On the morning of the eighteenth, troops continued to move into position for what would 
become one of the most famous battles in history. Wellington deployed the majority of his 
troops behind the Mont St Jean ridge with skirmishers placed on the forward ridge. He also 
deployed formations into the three farmhouses, Hougoumont, La Haye Sainte and Papelotte, 
in front of his position. These positions, particularly Hougoumont on the Duke’s right and La 
Haye Sainte in his centre would be critical bulwarks against the French assault. On the ridge, 
Wellington deployed a larger percentage of his force to his right, with a strong centre and 
comparatively weak left wing, expecting Prussian reinforcement on this side. Overall, 
Wellington had approximately 67,000 troops and 157 cannon, with a further 17,000 deployed 
at Halle who would have no bearing on the battle.
45
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Opposite Wellington, Napoleon’s troops were slowly coming into position. Napoleon’s 
troops were more evenly spread to respond to the developing situation. Many of his units had 
also suffered relatively light casualties on the sixteenth, if any at all. Overall he had 73,000 
troops and 246 cannon arrayed against Wellington. However, the troops were still making 
their way up to the front well into the morning and while the Emperor had wanted to 
commence operations at 9am the French troops were simply not in position.
46
 The Guard 
would still be arriving as the French assault began. Based on the available evidence Napoleon 
was little concerned at this point as he was not expecting any Prussian involvement in the 
battle.    
 
Wellington’s decision to resist Napoleon on the ridge, rested on the promised support of Field 
Marshal Blücher. Blücher directed three of his four Corps on to Mont St Jean, including the 
still uncommitted Corps of General Bülow. While the march began at daybreak the rain had 
added to their difficulties by eroding much of the poor quality roads between Wavre and 
Mont St Jean. Wellington expected Blücher to start arriving by 9am, and even, allowing for 
delays, by 11am, but these impediments would add several hours to the march. The 
remaining Corps was left at Wavre to protect the Prussians from Grouchy’s detachment. This 
would not be easy given that the French force was nearly twice that of the Prussians.
47
  
 
The battle of Waterloo began with the French assault on Hougoumont at around 11:30am 
according to most accounts. These French soldiers engaged Hanoverians and Nassauers in the 
wood, using superior number to slowly push them back. After about an hour the German 
units were forced to retreat to the Chateau. French attempts to assault the garden were less 
successful as they were shot down by troops behind the wall. Some Frenchmen, it is claimed 
by Allied sources, breached the southern gate, but were forced back by the Nassauers.
48
 
Meanwhile, British units reinforced the remaining Hanoverians, driving the disordered 
French out of the orchard and setting up a defensive line on its edge. The reinforced French 
attacked to the west of the farmhouse and slowly drove back the British troops. The British 
                                               
46
 Peter Hofschröer, 1815: The Waterloo Campaign - The German Victory, London, 2004, p.70. 
47
 Christopher Bassford, Daniel Moran, Gregory W. Pedlow, eds., On Waterloo: Clausewitz, Wellington and the 
Campaign of 1815, clausewitz.com, 2010, p.154. 
48
 The specific details are only recorded by one Nassau sergeant but his report is supported by at least one 
British veteran. Sergeant Buchsieb in Glover, ed., Waterloo Archive: Vol. V, p.115; Thomas Wedgwood in 
Gareth Glover, ed., The Waterloo Archive: British Sources Vol. I, Barnsley, 2010, p.147. Gareth Glover, 
Waterloo: Myth and Reality, Barnsley, 2014, p.121.  
British National Identity and the Battle for Waterloo Kyle van Beurden 
 
29 
 
retreated to the open northern gate, which had been left as such to receive supplies from the 
ridge. However, the French were too close and they managed to breach a small gap in the 
closed door, before the crossbeam could be put in place. Between thirty and forty men 
breached the gate. Lt Colonel Macdonnell, commanding the garrison, showed great 
composure and ran forward with a small group of officers and soldiers to seal the door before 
more Frenchmen could get in. Once secured the isolated Frenchmen who had breached the 
door were killed.  
 
While the battle within Hougoumont continued, Napoleon made his second move. At around 
1:30pm 62 French guns were arrayed between their infantry formations and began firing on 
the Allied line.
49
 While a standard Napoleonic tactic, with the skirmishers forward of the 
ridge too dispersed to hit, the French were forced to fire upon the unseen troops on the 
reverse side of the ridge.
50
 While some allied soldiers were killed, the order to lie down 
resulted in the vast majority of cannon flying harmlessly over their heads. The muddy terrain 
further reduced the cannon’s explosive capacity. After a thirty minute bombardment, the still 
uncommitted d’Erlon Corps was ordered to advance. Consisting of four divisions and around 
18,000 men, the troops marched forward, taking up most of the space between La Haye 
Sainte and Papelotte. Cavalry provided protection on their flanks. The two divisions on the 
wing had to detach units to deal with the farmhouses but the middle divisions pushed forward 
like a human battering ram. This was unpleasant work for the French soldiers, as they were 
forced to march under Allied artillery fire in mud that slowed their advance.  
 
As the French closed in on the ridge, their artillery was forced to stop firing allowing the 
Allies to fire artillery unmolested into the French mass. But the Allied left wing had the 
fewest artillery units and they could not inflict enough damage.  British Riflemen on the 
forward slope were forced to withdraw and the garrison in La Haye Sainte was under extreme 
pressure. Attempts were made to reinforce the farmhouse but they were caught by French 
cavalry.
51
 The main French assault faced a brigade of Netherlands troops who after a 
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numerically uneven firefight were forced to withdraw behind the British units to regroup.
52
 
The British units moved forward. Those under Kempt on the right were able to stop the 
French advance, though the French remained in position, as both sides reorganised their 
formations. To the left, where Pack commanded, the French were more successful and British 
units were forced to withdraw.
53
 General Picton was also killed at this time. Little stood in the 
way of these Frenchmen and with another division in support to their right, the allied line was 
close to collapse.  
 
The line held because Lord Uxbridge was operating in this sector of the field with the British 
heavy cavalry and saw the developing situation. He ordered the heavy cavalry forward to 
engage the French hoping to catch them before they could form a defensive square. This was 
made a little easier by the French not advancing in their usual column formation. The French 
altered the shape of the column so that more men were in the front line, allowing it to bring 
more muskets to bear against the British infantry who were operating in a line formation. 
However, this did mean the French would find it more difficult to quickly change into square, 
if the Allied cavalry attacked. Given that British cavalry attacks had not been a major factor 
in the Peninsula this potential problem had, seemingly, been disregarded.
54
 The British 
cavalry made their way up the slope at a trot, as a faster speed would have drained the horses 
and endangered the Allied infantry. The lie of the land made it difficult for the French to see 
them so that by the time their presence had been discerned little could be done. French 
infantry, unsure of how to respond in their unusual formation, were easy prey and the 
cavalrymen hacked at them with little mercy. As the cavalry came over the ridge they 
accelerated and rode into the three most forward columns causing significant casualties.
55
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The British cavalry drove the French columns back, capturing two Eagles in the process. 
They were supported down the slope by the British and Netherlander infantry, both of which 
had reformed after the French assault. Somewhere between 1,000 and 2,000 prisoners were 
added to those killed. The pressure on La Haye Sainte was relieved, at least temporarily, and 
more troops were sent to defend the farmhouse, though without additional ammunition.
56
 
While a great success had been achieved the British cavalry could not be stopped and they 
charged at the French artillery further down the ridge.  
 
The attack on the French artillery brought great confusion and many French artillerymen 
were either killed or abandoned the field. But during the British charge, many commanders 
were either killed or, like Lord Uxbridge, lost control of their units. Bugle calls to retire were 
ignored and the British horsemen were exposed to a French cavalry counter-attack ordered by 
Napoleon. The British horses were now fatigued and the French showed as little mercy to 
them as they had shown to their infantry.
57
 The casualty list would have been higher but for 
British and Dutch-Belgian light cavalry who came to their aid, drawing the French cavalry 
away and forming up to cover their retreat. This action contravened Wellington’s standing 
order but saved many who had not advanced too far.
58
 Some of the surviving British heavy 
cavalry, along with some of the Netherlands infantry, escorted the prisoners to Brussels.
59
 
Meanwhile Lobau’s VI Corps was sent forward by Napoleon to protect d’Erlon’s survivors, 
allowing them to reform. While hostilities did not cease on this wing, there was a discernible 
lull, allowing both sides to regroup. 
 
The engagement at Hougoumont failed to dissipate at this time, as the Allies were forced to 
place more troops into the farmhouse to hold it. Meanwhile, the French eventually deployed 
an entire Corps to take the farmhouse. With all their infantry committed, except the Imperial 
Guard in reserve, the French deployed approximately 4,500 cavalrymen against the Allied 
position. The allied infantry were forced into a chequerboard of squares and for the better part 
of three hours the French horsemen charged up the hill, attacked the squares, withdrew back 
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down and repeated the process. Meanwhile, when the French cavalry had retreated out of 
harm’s way, their artillery bombardment recommenced, which was more destructive on the 
allied infantry as they were forced to remain in square. Fortunately for the allies, the mud, the 
slope and the narrow defile for the cavalry between Hougoumont and La Haye Sainte 
affected their cohesion. With further disorder created by the infantry squares, the allied 
cavalry, with the Dutch-Belgian heavy cavalry in the vanguard, launched numerous 
successful counterattacks against the French.
60
 However, the French simply responded by 
deploying more horsemen up the ridge. With this increase, the French cavalry now dwarfed 
their allied counterpart. Some units were still ordered forward but they were often summarily 
beaten back by the wave of Frenchmen. The Cumberland Hussars, a Hanoverian cavalry unit, 
actually abandoned the field en masse, though they were the only allied unit to do so.
61
 
Wellington’s infantry were forced to weather the assault. A number of allied squares were 
said to have lost their cohesion and withdrawn, though they must have always returned to 
their positon because the French did not break an Allied square.
62
 The mixture of British and 
German units that made up the allied centre was hit particularly hard. Wellington was forced 
to order allied units from other parts of the battlefield to his centre. While initially inducing 
fear, the cavalry’s inability to break the squares saw the infantry prefer the cavalry charges as 
a temporary relief from the horrendous artillery bombardment.  
 
The French pressure also increased on La Haye Sainte and Hougoumont. Both positions had 
received much needed reinforcements from the ridge but only Hougoumont had received 
extra ammunition thanks to the actions of a brave private of the wagon train.
63
 From around 
3pm French troops assaulted La Haye Sainte for the better part of two hours. But without the 
distraction of a French infantry advance against the main allied line, the Germans inside 
could focus their attention on this threat and forced the French to withdraw. Concurrently at 
Hougoumont, a French advance was stopped in its tracks by an Allied bombardment on the 
ridge. The French changed their tactics and began bombarding Hougoumont, with the roofs 
of the great barn and chateau catching fire. Many wounded who had been placed in the barn 
were burned alive in the inferno, despite their comrades’ best efforts. However, the position 
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was not abandoned, and when the French breached the west door, the Nassauers fought the 
enemy fiercely and with the strong support of the British Guardsmen, overwhelmed their 
enemy with only a few French escaping back through the gate.
64
  
 
The situation deteriorated for the French at around 4:30pm following the arrival of the 
Prussians on their right flank. The Prussians had endured a tumultuous time trying to reach 
the battlefield. The muddied path had retarded their advance, and they had also been forced to 
march through Wavre to avoid Grouchy’s advanced cavalry. In addition a fire broke out in 
Wavre delaying some of the formations.
65
 The Prussians were led by the Bülow’s untested 
Corps, with another in support, while the remainder headed towards Wellington on the ridge. 
The French did not openly respond to this threat and the Prussians were able to cross the 
boggy Lasne valley unhindered by the French, with the first brigade arriving at the Paris 
wood at around 4pm. They were joined by another brigade at 4:30pm. The French had still 
done nothing to stop their advance but Blücher had grown so worried about Wellington’s 
situation that, over Bülow’s protests, he ordered an immediate attack on the French near 
Plancenoit, in order to relieve the pressure.
66
 The small Lobau Corps, already near the village, 
deployed into action. However, with the arrival of the rest of this Prussian Corps, the 
Prussians had a 3:1 advantage in manpower. The French could not hold out indefinitely. 
Napoleon decided to take men from his reserve and ordered the 4,500 men of the Young 
Guard forward to Plancenoit to support his units there. The Emperor was well aware that if 
the village was lost so was the battle. 
 
The French cavalry attacks finally came to an end at around 6pm. Hougoumont continued to 
hold but became less relevant as the French shifted their focus to La Haye Sainte. Napoleon 
finally recognised that capturing La Haye Sainte was critical to breaking the Allied line.
67
 
Fresh troops under Marshal Ney were deployed and despite the garrison’s tenacious defence, 
without ammunition, they could not hold out. The allies sent out relief units but they were 
overrun by supporting French cavalry. Following its loss another unit was sent forward to 
retake the farmhouse but it too was overrun by cavalry.
68
 The French took the farmhouse 
which allowed their artillery to be moved forward. The allies on the ridge endured a ferocious 
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barrage and sustained heavy casualties. Marshal Ney called for more men to take advantage 
of this success but none were forthcoming as the Prussians had nearly captured Plancenoit.   
 
Despite the presence of the Young Guard, the Prussians were slowly moving through 
Plancenoit, taking the village in heavy street fighting. Prussian reinforcements also started to 
appear. Some reinforced those at Plancenoit and, after some confusion, the others moved 
towards Wellington on the Mont St Jean ridge. The Prussian arrival on the ridge allowed 
British cavalry units on the allied left to be dispatched to the crumbling centre.
69
  Even 
without these units, the Prussians were still making progress at Plancenoit. Napoleon, despite 
the pleas of Marshal Ney for reinforcements to exploit La Haye Sainte’s capture, ordered two 
and a half battalions of the Old Guard to recapture Plancenoit. Though only consisting of 
1,500 men, they were veterans and successfully bayonet-charged the village. The Prussians 
were forced back and, with their success helping to reinvigorate the Young Guard, they 
retook Plancenoit.
70
 Napoleon had stabilised his right wing.  
 
While the French had stabilised their right wing, it was obvious that the Prussian superiority 
in numbers meant they could not be held off indefinitely. Unfortunately for Napoleon, 
Grouchy and his 33,000 men had been locked in a battle with the Prussians at Wavre since 
4pm which had seen neither side gain any real tactical advantage.
71
 Though the Emperor was 
not aware of this at the time, the successful Prussian deployment of so many troops must 
have convinced him that Grouchy would not be intervening in the day’s proceedings. 
Recognising that the Prussian superiority in numbers meant that he could not hold on to 
Plancenoit without more troops, Napoleon convinced himself that if he could destroy 
Wellington’s troops, he could divert his forces from the ridgeline to deal with the Prussians. 
While hindsight would point to a number of problems with this assessment, rather than 
retreat, Napoleon chose to deploy the majority of his reserve, the remaining Guard units, 
against the Duke.  
 
The final assault of the Imperial Guard was launched at around 7:30pm with the remaining 
French units fighting around Hougoumont and La Haye Sainte providing additional support.
72
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The Imperial Guard advanced with their artillery which began to pour heavy fire into the 
Allied line. Most of the allied artillery had used up its ammunition and the Guard sustained 
minimal casualties. Seeing this, the Netherlands General Chassé ordered his artillery forward 
to the ridge, though only one of his two batteries did so.
73
 Two battalions of the French 
Grenadiers reached the centre of the ridge and attacked the British brigade of Colin Halkett, 
the Brunswickers, the Nassauers and some Hanoverian units.
74
 The artillery forced the 
Hanoverian units to retreat, and they were followed by the Brunswickers.
75
 The British 
brigade was also forced back in the confusion
76
 and the Prince of Orange was wounded 
leading the Nassauers in a counter-charge that failed once he had been knocked out of 
action.
77
 However the counter-charge provided the British and Brunswickers time to regroup 
and the Netherlands artillery began firing from close range at the Guards. A Netherlands 
brigade of the division of Chassé also reached the front at this time and, after a brief firefight 
with one of the Guards battalions, was ordered to bayonet-charge the Guard.
78
 The other 
Guard battalion, seeing the mass of Netherlanders rushing towards their comrades, with the 
Brunswickers following this movement, withdrew back down the ridge.
79
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The Grenadiers were followed by the Chasseurs of the Guard who attacked to the left of the 
Grenadiers, closer to Hougoumont. The Chasseurs ran into Maitland’s British Guards who 
had sustained relatively light casualties throughout the day. These British Guardsmen had 
been ordered to lie down during the French advance, reducing the impact of the French Guard 
artillery that accompanied the infantry, and deceiving the French as to the size of their force. 
Upon the French reaching them, they were ordered to stand and delivered devastating volleys 
into the two battalions of the 3
rd
 Chasseurs, forcing them to withdraw.
80
 They also received 
support from the Netherlands artillery.  
 
Maitland’s men followed the French forward, but they were hit by the French 4th Chasseurs 
who came up in support of their retreating compatriots, along with formations of the French 
Corps fighting around Hougoumont. Maitland’s men were forced back by this fresh advance 
and the unit lost cohesion, retreating up the hill. Colonel John Colborne, commanding the 
British 52
nd Foot, a large and more experienced regiment than most under Wellington’s 
command, audaciously wheeled to the left flank of the advancing French, a move supported 
by the other units in the brigade by its commander Major General Adam. Below the ridgeline, 
the 52
nd
 marched rapidly across the ground and approaching the French columns fired several 
musket volleys. Despite initial attempts to return fire, the French could not stand and the 
units, including the famed Guard, withdrew.  
 
With the floor of the shallow valley removed of French troops and the Netherlands troops 
having forced the French to abandon La Haye Sainte, Wellington, sensing the moment, 
ordered the entire Allied line to advance. The British light cavalry, with the relatively fresh 
brigades of Vanderleur and Vivian forming the vanguard, led the charge and these units 
decimated the French troops trying to hold formation.
81
 Meanwhile, the Prussians were 
pushing the French out of Plancenoit and the French line collapsed under the unrelenting 
pressure. Some of the Imperial Guard units were able to maintain formation and the British 
cavalry paid for their over-exuberance against these units with heavy losses. But these men 
could not stop the rout that was unfolding around them and the French retreated in disorder.
82
 
As the Duke of Wellington and Prince Blücher met with their respective troops at La Belle 
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Alliance, the Prussian troops who were less tired, despite their heavy exertions just getting to 
the battlefield, took full responsibility for the pursuit of the French. Gneisenau ordered that 
the pursuing units beat the charge, creating further chaos for the fleeing French.
83
 Overall, 
throughout the day, 15,000 troops under Wellington became casualties along with 7,000 
Prussians. Meanwhile anywhere between 25,000 and 40,000 Frenchmen were killed, captured 
or wounded over the course of the eighteenth of June.
84
  
 
The 19
th
 of June and beyond 
Grouchy would not become aware of the disaster until around midday on the nineteenth. The 
Prussians had launched an assault, anticipating his withdrawal, and they were very nearly 
overwhelmed. Despite this, any success for Grouchy by this stage was inconsequential and he 
was forced to retreat, with Blücher detaching troops from one of his Corps to head them off.
85
 
While he had been rather lacklustre during much of the campaign, Grouchy executed a skilful 
withdrawal, escaping the Prussians’ grasp. Napoleon had hoped that these troops could 
reinforce him, but this was impossible given the Emperor could not adequately reassemble 
his army and he fled to Paris to deal with the ensuing political intrigues. On June 22 after 
returning to Paris and realising that France would no longer support him, he abdicated in 
favour of his son. Naturally, his then four year-old son did not succeed him. While he 
contemplated attempting an escape to the United States, he realised the Royal Navy had made 
this impossible and he demanded asylum from the HMS Bellerophon. He was eventually 
exiled to St. Helena, in the South Atlantic, where he would remain until his death in 1821. 
 
As this was going on the Allies commenced their invasion of France with the Prussians, their 
leader enthusiastic to reach Paris first, in the vanguard. While both Wellington and Blücher 
invested sieges, the Prussians did most of the fighting and consequently sustained the 
majority of the casualties during this stage of the campaign. Their casualty list was higher 
than necessary, however, due to the Prussian attitude that France was an enemy country, and 
therefore open to licentious behaviour. Conversely, Wellington imposed strict rules on 
looting by his troops and their progress was markedly less costly. The Prussians also suffered 
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casualties outside Paris. Overall though, the casualty list was much lower than the first four 
days of the campaign, leading many to assume that the invasion of Paris was more a 
procession than a march. On July 7 the allies occupied Paris, with the British on the north 
bank and the Prussians on the south. Müffling, Blücher’s liaison officer to the British during 
the campaign, was appointed Governor of the city. Aside from a few investments of fortress 
towns, the Waterloo campaign was over. For Britain, and the rest of Europe, two decades of 
war were over. But as the next chapter will show the consequences of these wars, and this 
particular campaign, would be felt for many years to come.  
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Chapter 2 – War, the Military and British National 
Identity 
 
Linda Colley suggests that a proud military history and culture, centred on the recurring 
warfare with France in the ‘long eighteenth-century, were focal points of a well-established 
British national identity by the Victorian era.
1
 However early nineteenth-century Britons were 
not imbued with fervent nationalism. Rather, the Revolutionary and Napoleonic wars were 
patriotic
2
 conflicts that, even as they took place, ‘reinforced the conservative social 
structure’.3 Ultimately though, this ‘reinforced conservatism’ proved deceptive and 
temporary. To meet the unprecedented demands of mobilisation the British government 
encouraged a deep-seated hatred of France, which benefitted from a century of recurring 
conflict. Conflict with a common enemy helped to unify a broad cross-section of the Isles, 
establishing a more British national identity. This unity, along with wartime demands, created 
the necessary conditions for political change. After the victory at Waterloo, Colley focused 
on the political changes in Britain, regarding these developments as the final component in 
establishing a British national identity. For most historians, the role of war in national identity 
in this period is separated from the militarism that gripped Britain in the 1890s. While 
Michael Paris has argued that this militaristic identity developed earlier, he still views them 
as separate phenomena, a reflection of post-1815 war-weariness.
4
 But war continued to 
influence identity in Britain after Waterloo through the publication of the numerous and 
popular memoirs from veterans of the Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars. This chapter will 
show how the wars that ended in 1815 helped to develop a more inclusive British national 
identity, providing the necessary context for political and societal change. 
 
The outbreak of war between Britain and France in 1793, had initiated an almost unbroken 
twenty-two year period of ever-expanding war between the two nations.
5
 France had been at 
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war with other nations in Europe since 1792 and, buoyed by the doctrine of the Revolution, 
had been able to conscript enormous numbers of highly motivated citizen-soldiers, to engage 
and subdue the other European powers. These men found this motivation in that the new 
doctrine allowed for them to have a voice, theoretically at least, in the political direction of 
their nation. Invigorated by these ideas and aggrieved by the invasions of the old European 
monarchies, Frenchmen fought tenaciously to spread the benefits of the Revolution to the rest 
of the continent.
6
 The growth of these conflicts demanded a far greater involvement of the 
British population than in any previous war. Rapid growth in personnel was not a new 
phenomenon in the British military, all eighteenth-century wars were marked by the initial 
period of expansion, as peacetime Britain did not maintain large armies like continental 
Europe. Additionally, eighteenth-century warfare had seen a marked increase in the 
consumption of both money and men to the point that during the American Revolutionary 
War the British armed forces had peaked at over 190,000 men.
7
 However, the Revolutionary 
and Napoleonic Wars marked a profound and rapid escalation. By 1812, 140,000 men served 
in the navy alone, while a quarter of a million men were in the army by 1814. This already 
enormous force was augmented, as early as 1804, by the presence of half a million men either 
in the militia or volunteer units for home defence.
8
  
 
This unprecedented mobilisation of the British population had posed numerous problems for 
the Government. Manpower, particularly in wartime, had always been a problem for Britain 
throughout the eighteenth-century, due to the atrocious conditions for the rank and file. As a 
result, the “dregs” of British society volunteered or were more often impressed into military 
service, in order to meet demands. This force would be routinely augmented by the hiring of 
large numbers of German mercenaries.
9
 The demands of the Revolutionary wars only 
exacerbated this problem. At its peak, one in five males was a member of a branch of the 
armed services. Consequently, it was simply not realistic to rely on prisoners or impoverished 
men to fill the ranks, rather men from all parts of society were needed to serve, if not in the 
regular army than at least in the militia or army reserve to repulse a French invasion.
10
 The 
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population disparity between Britain and France at this time only made the situation worse. 
The British government felt compelled to issue what they termed a Defence of the Realm Act 
in April 1798, in order to better ascertain the number of able-bodied men in each parish and 
the details of what service, if any, they were willing to do.
11
 Men who were not persuaded or 
pressed into service were forced to pay substantially larger amounts to the government in the 
form of the newly created income tax, to pay for the war effort. 
 
This caused major consternation amongst the British aristocracy, who greatly feared the 
threat posed by the arming, training and onerous taxation of such a large section of the 
impoverished and disenfranchised. The Naval Mutinies of 1797, though they were peacefully 
resolved, and the sailors had confirmed they would return to duty if the French invaded, were 
an indication of the legitimate fear the government had in addressing the French threat. The 
navy was the major impediment to a French invasion of Britain, and there was no guarantee 
that future mutineers would be so loyal in a crisis. This has not been accepted by all 
historians. David Powell, for instance, argues that the battle for control of the British state 
‘was a one-sided affair. In the 1790s the political advantages were all with the ruling 
authorities who were in a powerfully entrenched position, bolstered by strong popular 
loyalism and a heightened British patriotism’.12 While this might have seemed clearer in 
hindsight, it was not obvious to contemporaries. The government proved extremely reluctant 
to institute reforms which would strengthen both nationalist and patriotic ideals. This is 
particularly pertinent because of the success instituting nationalist reforms had had on the 
capacity of France to wage war. Linda Colley infers that, in relation to the British 
government having a nationalist agenda, ‘what is striking is not how much it (the British 
Government) attempted, but how much it left deliberately undone’.13 This fear was not 
unique to Britain. Governments across Europe were often equally reluctant to carry these 
changes out given the disastrous impact it had on the French crown and aristocracy. They 
instead focused on “patriotic incitement”. As Cookson argues, ‘rulers and ruling groups soon 
appreciated the wisdom of presenting wars as struggles in which the whole society had a 
stake and quickly developed the skills of patriotic incitement’.14 But even in this endeavour 
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Britain lagged behind the rest of Europe, with the government depending upon a century of 
animosity towards France generated by recurring warfare.  
 
While the British Government refrained from implementing a nationalist agenda, the wars 
against Revolutionary and Napoleonic France marked a rise in the public’s estimation of the 
army, allowing it to play a major role in propagating British national identity. Prior to these 
wars, Britons had been vehemently opposed to large domestic armies and viewed the 
ordinary soldier with something akin to contempt. While nearly a century of external war 
after the Union of 1707, particularly with France, had been significant in fashioning a British 
identity, there had been minimal positive impact on the public’s view of the army, excepting 
towards the aristocratic officer corps.
15
 With the ranks filled with the poorest of the lowest 
socio-economic class, Britons remained unsupportive of large domestic armies. The rise in 
public appreciation for the army resulted from the fear of a French invasion, which triggered 
soaring army enlistments in 1797, 1801 and in 1803-1805 when a large French army 
threatened to invade England.
16
 While the navy overcame the threats of invasion with 
Nelson’s victories at the Nile, Copenhagen and Trafalgar, it was the army’s long campaign in 
the Peninsula, and it’s much shorter one in Belgium and France, that finally removed any 
future threat. These successes, orchestrated by the army, with the navy playing a reduced role 
after Trafalgar, and the growing enlistment of men outside of the traditional “dregs” of 
society, helped to refashion the army in the public’s mind. Meanwhile, the expansion of the 
British army and the need for manpower greatly contributed to the breakdown of some 
cultural and identity barriers in Britain leading to a more homogenous British national 
identity. In particular, there was a marked increase in the enlistment of British Catholics, 
reflecting the relaxation of prohibitions against their arming under the Relief Act of 1793.
17
 
This contributed to the Scottish, Irish and Welsh in the army being ‘over-represented relative 
to their total number in the British population’.18 This developing British identity, founded in 
the crucible of war, expanded by the unprecedented scale of the conflict, and coupled with 
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the exposure to the new ideology of the Revolution, would have a profound impact on 
domestic discourse in the nineteenth-century.  
 
Public interest in Britain in the wars, and the battle of Waterloo in particular, exacerbated by 
the finality of its victory and the extended peace, remained quite strong throughout the 
period. However, wartime heroics were increasingly overshadowed as more pressing 
domestic issues gained public attention. For the British Government in the post-Waterloo 
period, the key foci were on lowering taxation, demobilisation and repaying debt. However, 
the economic contraction that followed the end of the conflict, due to a rapid drop in 
government consumption, was only exacerbated by the demobilisation of more than 300,000 
military personnel.
19
 These economic woes, coupled with the wartime demands on the 
population both in men and money, saw concerns of citizenship, mostly ignored prior to 
1789, become a central issue. As Colley states, ‘having been compelled to draw on the armed 
service and income of unprecedented numbers of its population so as to defeat France, the 
men who governed Great Britain found themselves under increasing pressure after the peace 
to change the political system so that all men of property, and all working men, were given 
access to the vote’.20  
 
In 1819, agitation for greater enfranchisement reached crisis point, forcing government 
action. However, rather than institute reform, the government crushed the demonstration, of 
50,000 to 60,000, at St Peter’s Field in Manchester, leaving fifteen dead, including Waterloo 
veteran John Lees, and hundreds more wounded.
21
 This incident later called the Peterloo 
Massacre, in reference to its contrast with Waterloo, marked the introduction of the Six Acts, 
restricting meetings and publications.
22
 While this put a dampener on demonstrations, it did 
not quell the public unrest. Economic woes, coupled with unprecedented wartime demands 
on the population, encouraged many, particularly in the unrepresented and increasingly 
wealthy middle class, to push for enfranchisement. 
 
Political reform would return to the public consciousness in Britain in the 1820s as the nation 
found itself in the midst of domestic political upheaval. In 1823, the Catholic Association was 
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founded in Ireland by Daniel O’Connell to campaign for full Catholic Emancipation across 
Great Britain. O’Connell successfully achieved the mass support of the Irish Catholic 
population, without presenting the government with unreasonable demands, mitigating claims 
that the Association was overly threatening.
23
 Additionally, by achieving mass support, it was 
made prohibitive for the British government to destroy them with military force as they had 
successfully and quite brutally done at St. Peter’s Field in 1819.  
 
The passing of Catholic Emancipation in 1829 reflected a major break with eighteenth-
century conceptualisations of Britain. The unprecedented demands of the Revolutionary and 
Napoleonic wars had made it untenable to ignore the potential contributions of Britain’s 
Catholic subjects. Eighteenth-century warfare against Catholic France had come to 
increasingly define Protestant Britain, which had developed around the animosity that had 
previously existed between Britain and Catholic Spain. War with Revolutionary and then 
Napoleonic France destabilised this, driven by the atheism of the Republic. Following on so 
soon from the war with Protestant America, Britons were forced to reassess their position on 
the Catholic issue. These wars demonstrated not only the loyalty of British Catholics but also 
the need for these troops. Ireland and the Scottish Highlands were predominantly Catholic 
and had been major recruitment sources for the British army.
24
 While many enlisted from 
necessity and a lack of alternatives rather than a deep sense of loyalty to Britain, particularly 
so the Irish, it was a major shift from previous conflicts where many had joined foreign 
armies to fight Britain.
25
  
 
This and other demonstrations of loyalty by Catholic minorities in Britain, along with a 
political desire to be more accommodating to Ireland to strengthen the Union, illustrated that 
anti-Catholicism no longer defined Britain as it had in the eighteenth-century. Added to this 
was the comprehensiveness of the victory in 1815. France, whether Catholic or not, was not 
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the threat it had been in 1793 and no Catholic nation had risen in its place. Internationally, 
Britain also cooperated with Catholic Austria and Orthodox Russia, as well as Protestant 
Prussia, in supporting the post-1815 order in Europe, even if the British Foreign Secretary 
Lord Castlereagh was sensibly sceptical of the Tsar’s rhetoric of a “Holy Alliance”. 
Naturally, Protestantism was not simply dismissed from the psyche of the British public, 
many continued to think in terms of Protestant supremacy, particularly regarding the issue of 
British monarchs marrying Catholics.
26
 However, the passing of Emancipation, legally at 
least, made minimal distinction between the rights of Catholic and Protestant Britons and was 
a major break from previous conceptualisations. 
 
The passing of Catholic Emancipation in 1829 provided an effective template for the budding 
parliamentary reform movement. As The Times, an ardent reform advocate, stated, quite 
presciently in 1830, ‘the defeat or triumph of the cause may turn upon the national unanimity 
and energy’.27 The reform movement would need to achieve the support of a broad cross-
section of the population, without appearing overly threatening to government authority. The 
section of British society that harboured realistic ambitions of enfranchisement were the 
middle-class, however as E. P. Thompson rightly pointed out, they needed the mass support 
of the working-class to effectively present their case.
28
 Many middle-class reform leaders, not 
enthralled with the much larger expansion of the franchise or even universal manhood 
suffrage espoused by some working-class reformers, proved adept at cloaking the reforms in 
terms of a nationalist crusade to restore freedom and liberty to Britain. While uniting the 
middle and working-class disenfranchised, leaders of the movement were also faced with 
bringing together people from the different parts of Britain in order to present reform as a 
pan-British cause. 
 
Despite the public displays for reform being driven by local communities, the symbolism 
employed demonstrated the pan-British conceptualisation of the appeal. At a reform 
procession in Edinburgh, a placard bearing Nelson’s order at Trafalgar, ‘England expects that 
every man will do his duty!’ was found interspersed with symbols of Scotland and Britain.29 
There was a strong call in Scotland for all Britons to have access to the benefits of English 
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liberty in order to address the appalling corruption in their electoral structure.
30
 Meanwhile, 
Thomas Attwood’s Political Union in Birmingham refused to celebrate the passing of Reform 
in England and Wales until the Scottish equivalent had been passed.
31
 This was supported by 
some leading London journals with The Morning Chronicle recommending ‘that all public 
demonstrations of joy for the success of Reform should be postponed until the Scotch and 
Irish bills receive the Royal Assent’.32 
 
While the article acknowledged that most could not deny themselves the joy of their labours, 
it demonstrates the increasing sense of unity in Britain in this period. These were hardly 
isolated incidents as reformers used all manner of symbolism from across Britain to argue 
their case. Anti-Reformers did attempt to gain mass public support in the contemporary press 
but their efforts proved futile as the public largely viewed them as a seditious anti-British 
group working against the will of the people.
33
 The 1832 Reform Act proved less successful 
than many envisioned, though most advocates failed to realise this at the time.
34
 This resulted 
from pragmatic anti-Reformers, who recognised its inevitability, working to implement 
reform while minimising the ‘damage’.35 However, despite the fact that universal suffrage 
would not come until 1918 and 1928 for some women, it showed that a united British 
population could affect domestic political change.
36
  
 
The success of Reform depended principally on the collaboration of so broad a cross-section 
of the population and the growing sense of Britishness that helped to engender a sense of 
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unity across the Kingdom. This sense of unity was developed around the successful template 
provided by Daniel O’Connell and the Catholic Association in Ireland. However, the capacity 
for unity reflected changes precipitated by the demands of the Revolutionary and Napoleonic 
wars, which had aided in breaking down barriers that had previously seemed impossible to 
broach. J. E. Cookson has correctly observed that ‘statesmen and politicians never articulated 
the connection between national defence and reform’, but he has seemingly missed the 
point.
37
 The population did not precipitate change because of their individual service or 
contributions to the war, but because there existed a sufficient amount of unity within the 
population to challenge the government en masse.  Military service and other forms of 
contribution merely provided validation to themselves to challenge the pre-existing status 
quo. While previous identities remained, the wars allowed for a British national identity to be 
firmly established, providing the population with a sense of unity. Coupled with an 
unparalleled sense of entitlement, the population felt they were in a position to demand the 
political changes that occurred between 1829 and 1832.  
 
In spite of Linda Colley’s arguments many historians have denied or downplayed the 
relationship of war to a specifically British national consciousness and identity. One key 
component of the contrary argument is the time-lapse between the wars with France and 
Emancipation and Reform. Cookson strongly advocates this position.
38
 Many historians have 
perceived the process of developing a national identity in Britain being dependent on the 
entitlement of all to ‘English liberties’. This concept is often traced back to the Glorious 
Revolution of 1688, an event which is seen to have guaranteed British independence and 
liberties.
39
 This became an integral part of what Herbert Butterfield would critique as The 
Whig Interpretation of History; a construct in which Britons saw their nation as the 
unparalleled protector of liberties that were denied to other European nations via autocratic 
rule.
40
 Few present-day historians would accept many of the arguments put forward by the 
Whig Interpretation. Nonetheless, the concept of liberty, and the Reform Act of 1832, often 
coupled with the Industrial Revolution and the social changes it brought, are seen as the 
means by which to interpret British national identity in the nineteenth-century.
41
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This conceptualisation has led many historians to portray ‘nineteenth-century Britons as an 
essentially peace-loving, commercially-minded people who shunned warlike activity and had 
little interest in or respect for the army’.42 Even Colley has, somewhat tacitly, contributed to 
this idea by focusing on the political developments in Britain after 1815. Although 
conceptualisations of British liberty suited nineteenth-century British politicians, the fact that 
70% of the population were disenfranchised until 1918 makes it difficult to reconcile their 
claims of Britain being defined as such as nothing much more than rhetoric.
43
 Challenges to 
the political structure by the disenfranchised were an expression of changing identity in 
Britain, but the conceptualisations of liberty that come with this discourse only formed a part, 
and an overstated one at that, of this evolving identity.     
 
The role of war has often been downplayed in nineteenth-century identity because following 
the victory at Waterloo and the occupation of France there was a dissipation of public fervour 
for war. This reflected war-weariness from a conflict that had spanned two decades.
44
 But as 
time progressed, and a new generation was born and the memories of the older ones faded, 
the nation increasingly projected a more bellicose attitude internationally. Furthermore, from 
1830, British supremacy had a rival in the form of France, following a more peaceful 
Revolution there, and the collapse of the United Netherlands into Belgium and the 
Netherlands. This rebalancing of power allowed France to once again pose a threat to 
Britain’s colonial pre-eminence. In addition to the threat of France was a Russian state that 
increasingly attempted to impose itself on its various neighbours, endeavouring to expand its 
global power.
45
 While much has been made of the militarism of the 1890s that would lead to 
huge public support and mass enlistment in the initial phase of the First World War, it did not 
appear out of a vacuum. As Michael Paris reasons, ‘certainly it was during the 1890s that 
militarism became most evident, but throughout the century the essentially aggressive nature 
of the British was reflected as a powerful theme within popular culture, a culture which 
legitimized war, romanticized battle and portrayed the warrior as the masculine ideal’.46  
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These are important developments for British national identity but no work has analysed the 
role of war in the period between 1815 and 1850. Paris does establish tenuous links, 
acknowledging that even in the period of increased war-weariness between 1815 and 1830 
the country was engaged in colonial expansion. This was despite struggling to cope with its 
huge gains during the wars with France.
47
 He also provides evidence of growing appreciation 
in Britain of war and the army from 1830 to the Crimean War.
48
 This is the point in which the 
‘pleasure culture of war’, a phrase first coined by Graham Dawson, comes into being in 
Britain according to Paris, a topic that will be explored in more depth in chapter four.49 But 
previous works have tended to ignore or downplay the role of veterans of the Revolutionary 
and Napoleonic wars in this development. The number of memoirs published in the post-
Waterloo period, and even before the wars ended, was extraordinary, providing strong 
evidence of the public’s continuing interest in war in this period. Veterans, even more than 
the population, established a sense of Britishness at the expense of outsiders, but as the next 
chapter will illustrate, the ‘other’ was not the French, but rather the soldiers and indigenous 
populations who served as their allies throughout the Revolutionary and Napoleonic wars.  
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Chapter 3 – ‘They did not lose a man’ 
 
A general euphoria towards all allied participants swept across Britain following the victory 
over Napoleon at Waterloo. The nation was swept up in the jubilation of a second, far more 
decisive victory against Napoleon, in which Britain could claim a key role. The campaign’s 
success and the growing literacy in both serving army personnel and the British population 
more broadly, enabled veterans of the conflict to publish memoirs of their service to a 
receptive public. However, most works, many of which focused on the Peninsular War, were 
‘constructed as travelogues’ documenting ‘personal responses to the scenery and local 
customs’.1 Impersonal narratives failed to attract mass readership despite widespread interest 
in the topic. This changed with the publication of the memoirs of Moyle Sherer in 1823 and 
George Gleig in 1825. By individualising the conflict, they both projected war as ‘an exciting 
adventure’ and became exceedingly popular in post-Waterloo Britain. Their style was later 
adopted in John Kincaid’s memoirs, the first Waterloo veteran to project substantial pride in 
his ‘professional identity and military achievements’.2 This chapter will illustrate that despite 
the success of these new literary constructs, British veterans were more preoccupied with 
their army’s depiction as a fighting force, in contrast to the French and even more so their 
allies. This developed into a serious issue for William Siborne, who, in his efforts to construct 
a model of the battle, was forced to resolve disputes between British veterans and non-British 
sources. The repercussions of this historiographical conflict would, in time, have a profound 
influence on the developing public memory of the campaign in Britain. 
 
The arrival of the Waterloo Despatch into London on June 22, 1815, and the publication of 
the allied victory in the next morning’s newspapers produced a groundswell of appreciation 
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for the servicemen of the various nations of the allied forces.  One of the first articles 
regarding the battle in The Times declared, that when the Prussian Corps arrived at the 
battlefield ‘their presence was most highly serviceable’.3 That same newspaper had already 
stated on June 21, 1815, that at the battle of Quatre Bras ‘the sons of Britain did their duty. 
The troops of Nassau, the Dutch, and Belgians, all behaved with distinguished bravery; and 
our gallant Highlanders, who are ever foremost in danger, suffered greatly. The Brunswickers 
did honour to their country’.4 On June 29, The Times even published the official report of the 
Prussian operations during the four days by General Gneisenau.
5
  
 
Appreciation was not confined simply to the newspapers. Lord Castlereagh, the Foreign 
Secretary, said in the House of Lords, ‘the confederated soldiers who had fought under the 
duke of Wellington, the subjects of the king of the Netherlands, the Hanoverians, and the 
duke of Brunswick’s corps, were entitled to the Thanks of that House, as well as our own 
countrymen; and the Prussian army had the same claims on our gratitude’.6 As the scale of 
the success became known, following Napoleon’s abdication and the quick and relatively 
easy invasion of France and occupation of Paris, Britons began to realise that this probably 
signified the end to two decades of war. The accompanying enthusiasm resulted in the 
newspapers publishing letters received by friends and family from men in the battle, with the 
amazing survival story of Colonel Ponsonby being published more than two years later.
7
 In 
an effort to convey their appreciation, the British public established a fund to provide for the 
families of deceased soldiers of all allied nationalities, while the government provided 
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payments to all Allied troops on a pyramid scale based on rank.
8
 The generosity of the British 
people even elicited a response from King Frederick William of Prussia to the Chairman of 
the Waterloo Committee, thanking them for their generosity.
9
 Meanwhile British soldiers 
received a Waterloo medal for service in the campaign, which no doubt aggrieved veterans of 
the much longer campaigns in the Iberian Peninsula or the War of 1812 with the United 
States.
10
 Interest in the battle, enhanced by the finality of its victory and the extended peace, 
remained strong even as the political rights of the population became a central issue in 
Britain.   
 
While the notion of veterans compiling and publishing memoirs was not unprecedented prior 
to the Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars, the scale of works released during and after the 
wars most certainly was. There were a number of factors that resulted in an increase of these 
memoirs, the most obvious being the exceptional number of men who served overseas. 
However, while a disproportionate percentage of memoirs still came from senior officers, 
there was a marked growth in works from both subalterns and members of the rank and file. 
This reflected both the increasingly divergent backgrounds of the rank and file, as they no 
longer simply constituted the poorest and least educated of the working-class, and also the 
growth in literacy amongst that part of the population. By 1830 two-thirds of the British 
working-class were literate.
11
 Consequently, these memoirs, as well as those from officers, 
benefitted from the potential of a much larger reading market. One anonymous work by a 
soldier in the 71
st
 regiment, known only as Thomas, was claimed by its publisher to have sold 
more than 3,000 copies.
12
 The claim is impossible to validate and probably overstated, but the 
few reviews on it from the period do show that it attracted some acclaim. One review 
commented on its ‘success’ and noted the interest it ‘must excite’, while another observed 
‘the ready spirit of imitation it must inspire’.13 
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However, many of these memoirs were written in the old style of ‘travelogues’, with their 
authors seemingly more interested in describing their experiences with foreign cultures. For 
the men who discussed their combat experiences there was a clear focus on the melancholy 
and horror of their wartime experiences, particularly the deaths of friends. There was little 
mention of individual involvement. Thomas was no exception, presenting himself as a small 
part of a larger whole, cataloguing events that he experienced as part of a collective, and 
presenting himself as almost anti-military. Other veterans’ memoirs, like James Hope, were 
even ready to describe events that were detrimental to the military image of British soldiers.
14
 
Commentators, such as John Lockhart, who in 1819 had described Thomas’ work 
approvingly, by the mid-1820s, were referring to most memoirs as dull and unpatriotic.
15
 
While there was a propensity to publish memoirs in this period, their adherence to the 
‘travelogue’, a feature of their eighteenth-century equivalent, coupled with an overwhelming 
sense of moroseness about their experiences, prevented their achieving a powerful resonance 
with the British public.   
 
The style in which memoirs were presented progressively changed with the 1823 publication 
of Moyle Sherer’s Recollections of the Peninsula16 and, even more so, with the 1825 release 
of George Gleig’s The Subaltern.17 Both former junior officers, they discuss events in the 
Peninsula, with Gleig’s also covering his service in America in the War of 1812. Sherer 
proved adept at relating scenes of war in familiar, picturesque terms, allowing ‘ordinary 
British readers to more easily imagine and associate themselves with the experience of being 
a soldier on campaign’.18 Gleig extends this reconciliation between gentleman traveller and 
soldier, by ‘introducing the taste and feelings of the ‘man of peace’ into his professional 
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views of war’.19 In essence, Gleig writes from both perspectives. The success of these works 
reflected their authors’ deliberate attempt to construct a personal narrative telling readers of 
their experiences as soldiers in war. But this was not to condemn war, but in a sense to glorify 
it. As Ramsey articulates both ‘asked their readers to share their military enthusiasm’.20 
While neither was devoid of the melancholic horror of war, particularly when discussing the 
deaths of friends, there was a discernible distancing of their writing from war’s horrors.  
 
The successful integration of military memoirs and literary Romanticism by Sherer and Gleig 
meant that, by the time John Kincaid published his own several years later, memoirs had 
become an accepted and even popular genre in Britain.
21
 A veteran of the 95
th
 Rifles in the 
Peninsular and Waterloo campaigns, the popularity of Kincaid stemmed from his ability to 
inject a powerful sense of ‘cheerful stoicism’ into his work, with his experiences being 
presented as a military adventure. Kincaid, unlike Gleig and Sherer, focuses on his personal 
experiences of military combat, while maintaining the military enthusiasm that popularised 
their works. Revelling in his regimental identity and his individual role as a combatant, 
Kincaid projects himself as a ‘soldier hero’. Kincaid was careful to present himself as 
someone to be admired and held in esteem, as someone that ordinary Britons should aspire to 
emulate. War and its privations are seen as a natural state and one in which his comrades took 
great pride.
22
 Tales of melancholy and suffering, particularly respecting lost friends, are more 
noticeably absent than even in Sherer and Gleig.
23
  
 
The unprecedented nature of Kincaid’s work enabled his memoirs to achieve greater 
popularity than both of these previous works. With the removal of the horrors of war and his 
tendency to revel in combat, Kincaid successfully engaged with the public enthusiasm for 
war. In an eleven page review in The Monthly Review his work is placed in their library ‘by 
the side of the “Subaltern,” and not far from Napier’.24 Another extended review in The 
Monthly Magazine described the memoirs as ‘one of the most attractive, eccentric and 
animated volumes that has been produced by the British campaigns’.25 There was a particular 
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commentary on the humour in his work, given the subject matter, with The Monthly 
Magazine writing that ‘he takes the world’s roughness with the gayest nonchalance’.26 
Noting that the one fault with the book, according to reviewers, was that it was too short, 
Kincaid released a second memoir with more stories from his service in 1835. This was 
followed by the publication of a second edition of his original memoirs in 1838. This 
popularity ensured that Kincaid’s recollection would help influence the public memory of the 
battle of Waterloo.  
 
The growing popularity of memoirs from this period requires a reflection on the 
historiographical problems that accompany this source material. While the memoir is an 
important primary source, it is the memories of the writer rendered as a literary account, a 
‘notoriously unreliable and highly selective faculty’.27 As a consequence they are not viewed 
with the same validity as some other forms of primary source material, such as battlefield 
reports, letters or even diaries. Furthermore, the dramatic expansion of the memoir as a 
literary source coincided with the development of the novel in Europe. While the ‘memoir 
presents itself … as a nonfictional record or re-presentation of actual humans’ experiences’ 
the exploitation of novelistic techniques does lead to a blurring of that distinction.
28
 The 
influence of this can be seen in these memoirs by Sherer, Gleig and even more so Kincaid. 
The construction of the ‘soldier hero’ depends on the literary flair of the author and the 
removal of the horror and moroseness that accompanies the death of friends and ghastly 
sights in war. That it took time to develop is hardly unique. Paul Fussell’s analysis of the 
writings of British veterans from the First World War illustrates that the process of turning 
memoirs from something immediate to something more ‘literary’ can take up to a decade or 
more.
29
 As the lack of success of earlier works proves this was an important consideration for 
potential memoirists. In addition to this, memoirs often include authors’ propensities to 
justify mistakes or errors, often by blaming them on others, usually someone or a group they 
dislike, or simply highlighting the key facets of their careers that reflect well on them.
30
  
 
The attitudes of British veterans to the people and the customs of the nations in which they 
served also influenced the manner in which they wrote their memoirs. Gavin Daly noted that 
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‘general histories of the war … have given little consideration to British soldiers’ experiences 
outside a strictly military context’, a hardly surprising observation given that most works 
written as ‘travelogues’ disappeared into obscurity during the nineteenth-century.31 This is 
even more the case with Waterloo, due to the comparative shortness of the campaign, and the 
near obsession with its military aspects or memorialisation. The influence of these prejudices 
is important given that the Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars marked a substantial rise in 
nationalist fervour in many parts of Europe. In Britain, popular Francophobia ‘reached an 
unsurpassed intensity on several occasions of threatened invasion, most notably in 1803-
05’.32 However, as Daly observes with British soldiers, ‘what is startling is how similarly 
soldiers of the British army reacted to Spain and Portugal as a cultural ‘Other’ – as a counter-
image to themselves. … British soldiers were united in their shared sense of cultural 
superiority over the local peoples, and in much of what they found as repulsive, alienating, 
confronting, attractive, exotic and romantic. In creating a sense of Iberian Otherness, they 
helped to define themselves.’33 In the context of the campaign of 1815, tensions were 
exacerbated by the fact that many of Wellington’s non-British troops, who were veterans, had 
made their careers in the service of the Grande Armée.
34
 The fact that many had gained this 
experience in Spain, fighting against the British, only added fears of disloyalty to the little 
faith British servicemen had in their ‘new’ allies’ military competency.  
 
These early literary memoirists, like Kincaid, were not fixated on labelling foreigners as 
cowards. This feature developed as a by-product of desiring to project themselves and, by 
association, the British troops more favourably. Kincaid wanted to project himself and his 
comrades as the ‘beau-ideal’ of the soldier, proficient, professional, experienced in the 
hazards and rigours of campaign and battle, but he also wanted to portray them as successful, 
if possible, against the odds.
35
 When recalling the battle of Waterloo he stated ‘I was told, it 
was very ridiculous at that moment (between 2-3pm) to see the number of vacant spots that 
were left nearly along the whole of the line, where a great part of the dark dressed foreign 
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corps had stood, intermixed with the British when the action began’.36 The depiction of 
absent foreigners accentuates both the quality of his performance and the importance of both 
himself and his compatriots to overall victory. He extends this with his final summary, 
‘This was the last, the greatest, and the most uncomfortable heap of glory that I 
 ever had a hand in; and may the deuce take me if I think that everybody waited 
 there to see the end of it, otherwise it never could have been so troublesome to 
those who did. We were, take us all in all, a very bad army. Our foreign auxiliaries, 
who constituted more than half our numerical strength, with some exceptions,  
were little better than a raw militia—a body without a soul or like an inflated 
pillow’.37 
There is an obvious condemnation of non-British troops but it serves the larger purpose of 
explaining why the battle was so difficult to win while still projecting British pre-eminence. 
 
The allied troops under Wellington were not the only formations criticised by Kincaid. While 
the Prussians were not accused of abandoning their post, they were said to have arrived too 
late to have any impact on the battle. Kincaid states, 
‘it is certain that the promised aid (Blücher’s promise to Wellington) did not  
come in time to take any share whatever in the battle. It is equally certain that 
the enemy had, long before, been beaten into a mass of ruin, in condition for  
nothing but running and wanting but an apology to do it; and I will therefore  
ever maintain, that Lord Wellington’s last advance would have made it the  
same victory had a Prussian never been seen there’.38  
While Kincaid acknowledges that it will ‘ever be a matter of dispute what the result of the 
day would have been without the arrival of the Prussians’, the forcefulness of this statement 
shows that, respecting his view, there was no ambiguity.
39
 However, while these descriptions 
are direct, they are not the driving force behind the work. They are few and far between, 
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rather than being repeated continuously, and they are used to endorse claims of both 
Kincaid’s and the British army’s prowess. It almost seems that Kincaid assumed that the 
readers were aware that this was the case and it did not need to be defended.
40
 However, the 
reviews would indicate that the public did not seriously engage with the portrayal of 
foreigners. There was greater interest in the humour of his stories with reviews often quoting 
excerpts with a comedic undertone, confirming the notion of ‘cheerful stoicism’.41 As a 
reviewer for his later work Random Shots from a Rifleman noted, ‘we know not that we ever 
met an author who can more easily fabricate an amusing and instructive volume out of 
slender materials’.42 Foreigners, for the most part, were only included when they appeared in 
an anecdote, usually at their expense.  
 
This seemingly caused concern for some veterans and memoirs that were released after 
Kincaid started to address the question of the incompetence of the foreign contingents more 
directly. In 1834, Major Henry Ross-Lewin, a veteran of the 32
nd
 Regiment, released his own 
memoirs. Being one of only two British officers court-martialled for cowardice after 
Waterloo, for which he was later exonerated, he had a unique perspective on what he was like 
to be accused by others with no evidence.
43
 But while he failed to discuss this experience in 
his memoirs, he proved comfortable making unfounded allegations against the non-British 
troops. The accusation of cowardice against ‘les Braves Belges’ (the Dutch-Belgians) as they 
are ironically referred to, is attributed to ‘a want of heartiness in the cause’, while the foreign 
cavalry were said to be ‘breaking and galloping off in all directions’.44 Ross-Lewin describes 
events he could not have witnessed such as the Nassauers having been ‘quickly dislodged’ at 
Hougoumont, while the British Guards were ‘more stubborn’. Meanwhile the Prussians, after 
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the failure of their initial assault on Plancenoit, did not re-engage the French until after the 
Imperial Guard had been defeated. In contrast, his divisional comrades resisted the French 
with the ‘utmost intrepidity’.45  
 
Ross-Lewin goes a step further than Kincaid by providing an assessment of all the major 
nations that fought during the wars whether he saw them in action or not. Stereotypes help fill 
in the gaps. Respecting the national contingents at Waterloo, the Prussians are described as 
‘mere machines’, a result of ‘rigid discipline and a too frequent use of the cane’. This claim 
did have validity in the pre-1806 Prussian army but had been well outdated by 1815. It was 
also hypocritical given British officers’ propensity in this period to use the lash to keep the 
rank and file in line, a practice the Duke of Wellington strongly endorsed, and one ‘not 
absolutely abolished (except of course in military prisons) until 1881’.46 As for Wellington’s 
army, the Dutch troops are ‘heavy, stupid, and slow at manoeuvring’ while the Belgians’ 
‘celerity’ of movement ‘is more frequently observable on their retreat than in advance’.47 The 
German soldiers in Wellington’s army, with the exception of the highly regarded King’s 
German Legion, are completely forgotten. In all these aspects, Ross-Lewin has actively 
displayed the disquiet that he and many of his compatriots felt towards their foreign allies.   
 
The more dramatic development in Ross-Lewin’s work is the measurement of the British 
troops against their French counterparts. This analysis advises that British troops ‘with equal 
numbers, either cavalry or infantry will beat any soldiers in the world in an open country’, 
their cavalry were ‘superior in prowess’ though with an ‘ill-restrained impetuosity’ and their 
heavy infantry were the ‘best’ in Europe, ‘whether in the field of battle or in the breach’.48 
However, the light troops,
49
 despite the efforts of the King’s German Legion, ‘never attained 
to such a degree of perfection as might have been expected’ though they still ‘generally beat 
the French’.50 The Franco-British comparative characterisations are not all one way. The 
French soldiers are recognised for possessing greater intelligence, a testament to the greater 
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recognition granted to individual merit in the French army. However, Ross-Lewin is quick to 
point out the British soldier had a ‘still more valuable quality’, the courage to ‘stubbornly’ 
adhere to a position without an officer’s exhortation, unlike the French who often required 
‘artificial’ stimuli. This idea of ‘stubbornness’ bears similarities to the ‘cheerful stoicism’ of 
Kincaid, with the idea being that a true British soldier holds on to his position come what 
may, an ability he should take pride in. Seemingly it did not occur to Ross-Lewin that during 
much of the Peninsular War, and at both Quatre Bras and Waterloo, French soldiers were 
forced to advance under heavy artillery fire, at an unseen enemy, due to their deployment 
behind a reverse slope. Characterising the French had hardly been a focus of Kincaid, but for 
Ross-Lewin it was an opportunity to define British military supremacy against not only the 
French but, given their success in this period, all the nations of Europe. Acknowledging the 
French army adds to the prestige of those who defeated them.  
 
Despite the engaging analysis, Ross-Lewin did not achieve the public interest that Kincaid 
had before him. One veteran who was able to provide a more direct analysis of the non-
British units while still attracting public interest, was the unknown officer of General Sir 
Thomas Picton’s Fifth Division, who published a short memoir in the United Service Journal 
in 1835. The work proved exceedingly popular and would be republished by the Journal in 
1841. This officer wanted to send a clear message about his own unit and the foreign 
contingents. The anonymous veteran presents the great pride he felt in his divisional 
comrades, saying the ‘Fifth Division … stood its ground manfully’ some even likening it to 
the ‘defence of Thermopylae by the Spartans against the Persians’.51 Critical anecdotes were 
also offered such as the ‘braves Belges’ often being found ‘making their way to the rear as 
fast as they could’.52 However, the primary targets of quite a vitriolic tirade were the 
Prussians. In the mind of the author they were simply ‘held at bay by the French right’. 
However while operating in France he learnt ‘for the first time, that the Prussians had given 
us material assistance in the battle’. While willing to accept that Blücher and his men had 
kept their word in trying to reach the battlefield and they were therefore entitled ‘to his 
Grace’s53 best thanks’, he was appalled by their belief that they should ‘share in the laurels of 
the day at our expense’.54 He even theorised that ‘they did not lose a man’ as they had not, to 
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his knowledge, published a list of killed and wounded.
55
 In fact, Prussian casualties at 
Waterloo were estimated at 7,000, with over 1,000 killed in action.
56
  
 
The prejudices demonstrated in these memoirs were not isolated. In 1838, William Siborne, 
an army officer and gifted topographer, released to the public his ‘most perfect model’ of the 
Waterloo battlefield. This model, which began life in 1829, represented the designated 
‘crisis’ of the battle, at approximately 6:30pm, following the French capture of La Haye 
Sainte farmhouse, prior to the advance of the Imperial Guard. After being commissioned by 
the government to construct the model, Siborne spent eight months reconnoitring the 
battlefield and dispatched a series of letters to hundreds of surviving officers and the military 
staffs from all participating nations, except those from the Netherlands or Belgium.  
 
These ‘Siborne Letters’, as they are more commonly referred too, are the most extensive 
collection of British primary source material from the campaign, and they confirm the 
prejudice already shown. Some observations made by veterans included that of the Marquis 
of Anglesey, then Lord Uxbridge, and second-in-command at Waterloo, who described the 
‘impossibility of making’ a Dutch heavy cavalry brigade charge and being ‘excessively 
dissatisfied’ with their commander.57 A major in the light dragoons speaks of a Dutch-
Belgian unit ‘firing their muskets in the air, meaning to move off in the confusion’.58 Another 
speaks of the inability to ‘get the damned Belgians to advance’ while Lt-General Sir William 
Gomm speaks flippantly of the dispersal of the ‘Brunswick and Belgic cavalry’ at Quatre 
Bras.
59
  
 
Letters were not universally derisory. One British lieutenant spoke of the Brunswick cavalry 
behaving with ‘great intrepidity’ while their infantry were ‘fiercely engaged’ and two cavalry 
officers mentioned being in the rear of ‘Belgian infantry’, well into the afternoon.60 This was 
long after this unit was supposed to have abandoned the field according to a number of 
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veterans.
61
 However, positive statements to this effect were exceedingly rare. The Dutch-
Belgian units particularly suffered at the hands of these recollections. This problem was 
further exacerbated by Siborne’s failure to contact their veterans, a decision he rather 
unconvincingly tried to explain by saying he had already received sufficient material from 
British and German officers.
62
 Meanwhile Wellington’s German units, except for the King’s 
German Legion, were either being rallied by a British commander or more often were simply 
ignored. The letters that Siborne received overwhelmingly confirm that most British veterans 
felt that they, and only they, had been responsible for the victory at Waterloo.  
 
The Prussians presented an altogether different problem. Memoirists such as Kincaid, Ross-
Lewin and the anonymous veteran were highly critical of the Prussians but opinions in the 
few ‘Siborne Letters’ that discuss them were mixed. A lieutenant-colonel in the infantry did 
state that the Prussians were ‘still far to the left’ during the final assault, though he later 
contradicted himself by saying that their artillery shot was flying over their heads.
63
 Another 
veteran stated that after the initial Prussian assault, which the French ‘quickly repulsed’, ‘that 
corps of Prussians made no further progress, or any effort that I saw, during the remainder of 
the battle’.64 Conversely, a Captain Powell wrote that ‘between five and six the Emperor was 
so much pressed by the Prussian advance on his right that he determined to make a last grand 
effort’.65 The confusion, undoubtedly, reflected the fact that most of the British troops did not 
fight with the Prussians and, for the most part, could not see what they were doing.  
 
These limitations did not impede Major-General Sir Hussey Vivian, a commander of a 
cavalry brigade at Waterloo, championing the contribution of the Prussians. He wrote to 
Siborne that ‘in truth I care not what others may say, we were greatly indebted to the 
Prussians, and it was their coming on the right and rear of Napoleon that gave us the victory 
of Waterloo. We might have held our ground but we never could have advanced but for the 
Prussian movement’.66 Vivian’s comment ‘I care not what others may say’ shows that he was 
well aware that his robust defence of the Prussians was at variance with many of his fellow 
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veterans, but this did not change his opinion. The Prussians also provided Siborne with 
substantial evidence and this, along with the endorsement of Vivian, convinced him that the 
Prussians had made an important, if not critical, contribution to the victory. While unforeseen 
at the time, this would quickly develop into one of the more serious problems Siborne would 
encounter in his vast endeavour.   
 
Problems with the model began shortly after Siborne returned from his eight month survey of 
the battlefield. The newly elected Whig government were averse to financing a venture to 
glorify their political enemy, the former Tory Prime Minister Wellington, and cancelled the 
project. Furthermore, they requested that Siborne repay the funds he had already received 
unless he was prepared to complete the model at his own expense.
67
 Determined to complete 
the project he carried on and by the time it was completed his construction costs alone 
amounted to £3,000. A substantial sum at that time, in order to finance the model he 
requested subscriptions from officers and took out a loan of £1,500.
68
 Additionally, despite 
being out of Parliament, the Duke of Wellington was kept well informed of Siborne’s 
progress by his associates. As the project developed, Siborne received letters from 
Wellington’s associates who doubted his capacity to construct a model accurately depicting 
the scene he intended. They believed only the opening of hostilities could be accurately 
represented. While historiographic concerns with twenty-year-old memories were noted as an 
issue, another letter argued that a multitude of accounts would not only produce ‘a mass of 
contradictory information’69 but ‘weaken the high authority of the Duke’s despatch’.70  
 
This concern, in their minds, came to fruition with the layout of the Prussian troops on the 
model and the intended ‘share the Prussians actually had in deciding the battle’ came to be 
known.
71
 These concerns encouraged the Duke, through an intermediary, to request Siborne 
visit him in London. Perhaps unwisely, the request was denied. Siborne simply sent a letter 
confirming his intended dispositions of the Prussians. In a letter from March 1837, Lord 
Fitzroy Somerset, himself a Waterloo veteran, wrote to Siborne, ‘I still think that the position 
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you have given to the Prussian troops is not the correct one as regards the moment you wish 
to represent, and those who see the work will deduce from it that the result of the battle was 
not so much owing to British valour and the great generalship of the chief of the English 
Army, as to the flank movement of the Prussians’.72 It is clear that the Duke was trying to 
exert some pressure to depict the battle in a manner acceptable to his memory and reputation.  
 
Wellington’s relationship to the model has become exceedingly complex since the 
publication of Peter Hofschröer’s Wellington’s Smallest Victory. Substantial anecdotal 
evidence is available showing that as time after the battle passed Wellington became 
increasingly convinced that the British army and he individually had won the battle. Within a 
month of the battle the Duke stated in a private comment, ‘he owed the victory entirely to the 
admirable conduct of old Spanish infantry’.73 By contrast the new English regiments, while 
behaving ‘tolerably well’, often got ‘unsteady and alarmed’, requiring ‘great exertion’ to keep 
together while the foreign contingents would ‘probably have left the field altogether if they 
had not had the infantry to rally under’. Furthermore, he deigned to acknowledge that only 
after the defeat and disorderly retreat of the French Imperial Guard did he observe the fire of 
Bülow’s advancing columns, allowing him to order the general advance.74 He later claimed 
successes at which he was not present and even said to one friend that ‘Blücher’s main 
achievement had been to avoid Grouchy and arrive at Waterloo in order that the Prussians 
may profit by their victory’.  
 
However, it must be noted that these claims were made in private and were not published 
until after the Duke’s death in 1852. These later publications also included an explanation for 
his grievance at Siborne’s failure ‘in producing an accurate, and even intelligible, 
representation of the Battle of Waterloo … by having listened to every hero of his own 
tale’.75 The main problem for the Duke was that the positioning of the Prussians contradicted 
his memory. The Duke actually believed that no one could recollect Waterloo as well as he. 
Therefore the Waterloo Despatch, in his opinion, should have formed the cornerstone of any 
work on the battle. It was the obvious reluctance by many to follow this direction that 
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encouraged the Duke to almost plead in an anonymous memorandum ‘surely the details of 
the battle might have been left in the original official reports’.76  
 
Wellington’s personal desire to have the campaign presented as a victory solely owing to 
‘British valour’ and his ‘great generalship’ conflicted, as Siborne rightly pointed out, with 
both his public statements and original official reports. The Duke’s 1815 despatch was clear 
on the need to ‘attribute the successful result of this arduous day to the cordial and timely 
assistance I received from them (the Prussians). The operation of General Bülow … was a 
most decisive one … if I had not found myself in a situation to make the attack which 
produced the final result, it would have forced the enemy to retire’.77 The Waterloo Despatch 
also paid regard to several non-British officers under the Duke’s command ‘who operated 
much to the Duke’s satisfaction’, including General Kruse of the Nassau regiment, General 
Trip commanding the Netherlands heavy cavalry and General Vanhope who commanded a 
brigade of Netherlands infantry.
78
 General Vanhope did not exist but the duke indicated in his 
later report to the King of the Netherlands that he meant General d’Aubrêmé, although he 
actually meant Colonel Detmers.
79
 The Times would also report on the annual Waterloo 
Banquets, in which Wellington recognised foreign contingents, particularly when a veteran or 
dignitary of that nation was present.
80
 This position was reaffirmed in the 1842 
memorandum, though with no more detail. Siborne cited this as justification for the 
maintenance of his position on the Prussians. The anecdotes do illustrate that the Duke did 
not actually believe what he wrote but it was the public front he had established. With respect 
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to the Prussians, it would be the same one that Siborne would present when he released the 
model in 1838.  
 
Ultimately for Siborne, the model would not be a financial success but, contrary to his fears, 
this failure had little to do with his representation of the Prussians. The bigger problem for 
the model was the level of detail, as it pushed costs up dramatically. On display at Egyptian 
Hall in London from October 1838 until the end of 1839, 100,000 visitors paid to see the 
work. At an entry price of one shilling, the overall gross profit equated to approximately 
£5,000. While a substantial sum at the time, once accounting for the £4,200 in costs to his 
exhibition manager for transport and display, he was left with only £800 in profit. This meant 
that he could not cover the £1,500 loan or reimburse the model’s subscribers.81 Undoubtedly, 
he was cheated by the exhibition manager, but the £5,000 gross profit was still far less than 
he had expected, and much less than others had made with less sophisticated pieces, such as 
the Waterloo panorama, which made its creator £10,000 in profit.
82
  
 
Siborne had not foreseen that that the complexity of the model dissuaded public enthusiasm 
for the project. James Hope, a former Waterloo veteran, in a letter to Siborne in 1840, pointed 
out that ‘nine out of every ten take leave of the model, without having added anything to their 
previous store of information respecting the memorable event’.83 This claim was endorsed by 
contemporary reviews with only The Times reviewer in 1838 correctly ascertaining the 
moment of the battle being presented. This was only successfully deduced after reading the 
accompanying guide.
84
 The Morning Post inaccurately wrote that the scene being represented 
was during the middle of the attack of the Imperial Guard against Wellington’s army. This 
occurred around thirty minutes later.
85
 While some might claim that these discrepancies 
reveal that the public saw what they wanted to in order to better project the superiority of 
British arms the reviews do not support this conclusion. Firstly The Times review, which did 
ascertain the correct scene, wrote of the ‘powerful diversion’ effected by the Prussians.86 
They also acknowledge the Prussians had, at the point of time depicted on the model, 
engaged eight battalions of the Young Guard and three of the Old Guard, reducing the Guard 
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units still available for Napoleon to deploy against Wellington.
87
 Secondly, the only review 
that was critical of the placement of the Prussians was The United Service Magazine, a 
military journal, which wrote that the Prussians ‘are generally considered to bear too 
prominent a share in the battle.’88 But there were no accusations of deliberate deception and 
none of the other reviews listed this as an area of conjecture. The public were convinced of 
the quality of the British performance irrespective of the importance of the Prussians to final 
victory. But, for the most part, they had no clear idea of what scene the model was actually 
depicting.  
 
Siborne simply did not see it that way, and what he lacked in good business sense he made up 
for with a tireless work ethic. With the debt still hanging over his head he decided to 
construct a new model, make changes to his old one and complete a comprehensive history of 
the campaign. But Siborne was convinced that the Prussian issue must be addressed. The 
comments from Wellington’s associates were endorsed in the same letter by James Hope, 
who also articulated that while, ‘failure to this extent I really did not anticipate’, he did feel 
that model projected the battle as ‘not truly a British scene’. Hope reasoned, ‘had there been 
fewer of Father Blücher’s children in the distance, the model would undoubtedly had more 
(the look of a) British victory’.89 But Siborne did not seem to realise that all these critics were 
servicemen, not the general public. Convinced that the display of the Prussians was the major 
impediment to success, the downplaying of their role became a key area of change with his 
new Waterloo projects.  
 
As Neil Ramsey has shown, memoirs such as Kincaid, with his ‘cheerful stoicism’, captured 
the public imagination and assisted this genre gaining popularity and acceptance in Britain in 
the post-Waterloo period. However, this has overshadowed the significance of their content. 
As modern scholarship has rigorously argued, ‘‘identity’ is not fixed or singular, but rather, 
contingent, relational and contextual’, and for the British soldier of this period, their context 
was very different from that of the British civilian at home.
90
 This raises an issue with 
Colley’s premise. While the war with France was important to British identity, for the British 
serviceman at Waterloo, particularly if he was a veteran of the Peninsular War, troops 
operating in alliance with him were more often viewed in negative terms than their French 
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adversaries.
91
 This view was not only endorsed in the memoirs, both popular and unpopular 
with the public, but was consistent with the hundreds of ‘Siborne Letters’. Siborne was not 
completely convinced by these veterans’ depictions, but when he constructed a work at 
variance with their memory he drew some sharp criticism. Many historians have concluded 
that this reflected a public memory that, by the commencement of the Victorian Period, 
regarded Waterloo as a British victory. The evidence shown would indicate that only veterans 
and military personnel, including the Duke of Wellington, actually had problems with the 
model’s depiction of the Prussians. But as the next chapter will demonstrate, Siborne could 
not see this and concluded that the Prussians were impeding his desire for fame and fortune. 
His conclusion was to reduce their presence and construct a suitably British Waterloo 
narrative.   
 
 
 
 
                                               
91
 Daly, The British Soldier in the Peninsular War, p.15. 
British National Identity and the Battle for Waterloo Kyle van Beurden 
 
69 
 
Chapter 4 – ‘Not a truly British scene’ 
 
In the latter half of the nineteenth-century, the prejudice in veterans’ memoirs was effectively 
utilised to endorse the more militaristic national identity that developed in Britain. Almost a 
generation after the battle, the release of William Siborne’s history in 1844 saw secondary 
literature became the most prevalent form of Waterloo historiography. Intended for the 
aristocracy and educated middle class, there was both a discernible grandiloquence with 
respect to British heroism, and a depreciation of the contribution of the allied contingents, 
particularly the Prussians and Dutch-Belgians. While veterans’ were critical when they felt 
their unit was not appropriately recognised, the denunciation of the foreign contingents was 
readily integrated into the narrative. Though popular, by the time Siborne printed a mass-
marketable version, other writers, exploiting underdeveloped copyright laws, published their 
own more engaging interpretations of his thesis. Exceedingly popular, the works exposed to a 
mass audience Siborne’s questionable interpretation of events. Despite this, an intensification 
of nationalist hyperbole only developed later with the advent of war correspondents during 
the Crimean War. This new medium was eagerly engaged with by the public and they were 
increasingly deployed to report on colonial conflicts. War correspondents proved adept at 
projecting Britain’s wars as heroic, necessary and entertaining, and the public affection for 
the military and war intensified. This marked the British public’s comprehensive embrasure 
of the ‘pleasure culture of war’.1 This was complemented by the introduction into historical 
writing of ‘scientific’ constructs. Designed to improve the overall quality and accuracy of 
historical literature, they failed because, as Stefan Berger states, for historians the ‘desire to 
be ‘truthful’ … did not protect them from maintaining a wide array of historical myths, many 
of which became important in national collective memory’.2 New Waterloo histories from the 
mid-nineteenth-century utilised this concept, often in name only, to attribute victory to the 
British army even more vociferously than Siborne. The militaristic national identity that led 
to such enthusiasm and mass enlistment in Britain at the commencement of the First World 
War developed around these precepts over the latter half of the century.  
 
The financial failure of the Waterloo Model and the correspondence he had received from 
veterans encouraged William Siborne to reduce the prominence of the Prussians from a 
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number of new and old Waterloo-inspired endeavours. Firstly, he released a new model in 
1844, this time portraying events leading up to the charge of the British heavy cavalry against 
the massive French infantry assault in the early afternoon. Disregarding Dutch-Belgian and 
German involvement, it was a classic British scene of success against a superior French force. 
James Hope had already observed that this would have been a better choice for the original 
model as the latter did not represent ‘a truly British scene’.3 Concurrently, Siborne re-
released the original model, but only after he had removed the equivalent of 40,000 Prussian 
troops. Suddenly 48,000 Prussians became 8,000.
4
 This significant change was explained in a 
large footnote in his new two-volume history, reflecting the discovery of ‘new evidence’. 
Siborne concluded that Prussian witnesses had inadvertently erred, due to their inability to 
see all the actions of Wellington’s troops, concluding that their final assault on the village of 
Plancenoit coincided with Wellington’s defeat of the Imperial Guard. Siborne explains ‘in 
reality, there was an interval of at least twelve minutes between these two incidents’;5 by the 
time Plancenoit was permanently captured Wellington’s men were already advancing.6  
 
Siborne does not actually deny the Prussians impact on the battle. He acknowledges ‘that the 
powerful diversion effected by the Prussians diminished the strength of those French Lines 
by the Corps of LOBAU … by twelve Battalions of the Imperial Guard … and, finally, by 
eighteen Squadrons of Cavalry’.7 However Siborne concludes that the Prussian army, by 
‘operating a powerful diversion’, made Wellington’s advance ‘still more decisive, rendering 
the victory complete by a harassing and vigorous pursuit’.8 The use of ‘still more decisive’ 
indicates that Siborne believes the Duke would have been successful, if not as conclusively, 
without the Prussians. This is a surprising conclusion given that the Duke personally 
described the battle as ‘the nearest run thing you ever saw in your life’. Presumably, the 
diversion of 16,000 of the 73,000 French troops from Wellington’s line must have been 
decisive. The reasons for Siborne’s changes are made clearer, by Peter Hofschröer, Siborne’s 
most avid defender, who acknowledges that there is no evidence to suggest that between 
                                               
3
 James Hope in Gareth Glover, ed., Letters from the Battle of Waterloo: Unpublished Correspondence by Allied 
Officers from the Siborne Papers, London, 2004, p.286. 
4
 Peter Hofschröer, Wellington’s Smallest Victory: The Duke, the Model Maker and the Secret of Waterloo, 
London, 2005, p.196. 
5
 William Siborne, History of the War in France and Belgium in 1815: Containing Minute Details of the Battles 
of Quatre-Bras, Ligny, Wavre and Waterloo Vol. II, 2
nd
 ed., London, 1844, p.271. This extensive note, 
explaining the difference between the record of events in the book and their original presentation on the model, 
was removed by editors from the fourth edition published in 1894.  
6
 Siborne, History of the War Vol. II, 2
nd
 ed., pp.270-271. 
7
 William Siborne, The Waterloo Campaign, 1815, 4
th
 ed., London, 1904, p.597.  
8
 Siborne, The Waterloo Campaign, pp.597-598. 
British National Identity and the Battle for Waterloo Kyle van Beurden 
 
71 
 
1838 and 1844, ‘a most careful and diligent investigation of the whole question of the 
Prussian co-operation’ was ever conducted.9 Siborne, it must be concluded, made alterations 
to his work not because of evidence, but due to financial expediency.    
 
While the Prussian role was the most important issue, Siborne did not ignore Wellington’s 
allied contingents. The K.G.L were seen as equals, if not in some ways superior to British 
troops, but the other German troops, the Brunswickers, Nassauers, Hanoverians, while not in 
that league, deserved ‘the strongest commendation’.10 This was not so for the Netherlands 
troops. Some of the Dutch-Belgian infantry were accused of making a hurried retreat ‘not 
partially and promiscuously, but collectively and simultaneously’,11 while other units had to 
be blocked by British cavalry to stay in place.
12
 Additionally, the heavy cavalry at one point 
‘retired in such haste and disorder’ that they disturbed two squadrons of K.G.L. Hussars.13 
These largely inaccurate claims were not simply manufactured but were a recurring theme in 
the Siborne Letters. As Siborne surmised, ‘the fact of such supineness is too well attested to 
admit of any doubt respecting the value to be attached to their co-operation in the great 
struggle so courageously and resolutely sustained by the Anglo-Allied Army’.14 However, 
Siborne cannot abscond from some responsibility. As Gareth Glover points out, ‘his failure to 
procure any substantial information from the Dutch-Belgian contingent … led directly to the 
negation of any achievements of the Dutch/Belgian troops in the battle by virtually all British 
histories’.15 The Prince of Orange, divisional generals such as Perponcher and Chassé, and 
many lower-ranked officers were still alive at the time but the only source he obtained were 
the Prince of Orange’s papers, which, to him, were always superseded as a source by a 
British eye-witness.
16
 It is a curious deviation for a man who went to the trouble of contacting 
the Prussians and even the French that has never been satisfactorily answered.
17
  
 
The downplaying and denigration of the Allied contingents was an important component in 
presenting the campaign as a British military historical epic. The majority of those concerned 
                                               
9
 Hofschröer, Wellington’s Smallest Victory, p.196.  
10
 Siborne, The Waterloo Campaign, p.594. 
11
 Siborne, The Waterloo Campaign, p.395. 
12
 Siborne, The Waterloo Campaign, pp.526-527. 
13
 Siborne, The Waterloo Campaign, p.463. 
14
 Siborne, The Waterloo Campaign, p.591. 
15
 Glover, Letters from the Battle of Waterloo, pp.19-20. 
16
 Hofschröer, Wellington’s Smallest Victory, p.151. Keeping in mind in this era, the sources of non-
commissioned officers and the rank-and-file were not eagerly sought by historians and writers. 
17
 Hofschröer, Wellington’s Smallest Victory, p.120. 
British National Identity and the Battle for Waterloo Kyle van Beurden 
 
72 
 
with ‘sharing’ the victory were alarmed with the impact it might have on the Britishness of 
the victory. The manner in which Siborne presented the British in his work demonstrates his 
awareness of this issue. Techniques he employed included rhetorically questioning the reader, 
‘what then might not be achieved by such innate valour—by such consummate discipline?’18 
On other occasions he would instruct the reader ‘what exulting pride and heartfelt gratitude 
must not the British nation reflect on the heroic valour displayed by her sons’.19 Siborne even 
proved adept at redressing negative episodes. While initially successful, the British heavy 
cavalry charge quickly turned into disaster due to the formation’s ill-discipline and inept 
command. In the Netherlands it was later included in training manuals as an example of what 
not to do.
20
 However Siborne instructed, ‘Britons! Before other scenes are disclosed to your 
view, take one retrospective glance at this glorious, this instructive, spectacle’.21 In a rather 
obvious manner, Siborne is trying to encourage British readers to see themselves, both 
individually and collectively, represented in the exploits of their national army. 
 
The Britishness of the victory was, perhaps surprisingly to some, accentuated by Siborne’s 
exceedingly generous portrayal of the military ability of the French army. The French are 
assessed as being ‘unquestionably the finest Army which even NAPOLEON had ever 
collected together, formed exclusively of one nation—of that nation whose legions had at 
once subjugated nearly the whole of Europe—imbued with inveterate hatred against its foes, 
cherishing the most enthusiastic devotion to its Chief, and filled with the ardent desire of 
restoring the fallen glory of the Empire’.22 This appraisal of the Armée du Nord is simply not 
true. Most military historians would agree that this army was formidable and man-to-man 
superior to the allies. This is evidenced by their successes during the campaign, despite being 
heavily outnumbered by the combined allied forces. But Napoleon’s armies in the 1805-1807 
campaigns at Ulm, Austerlitz, Jena and Auerstadt were of higher quality. The French rank-
and-file also feared the loyalty of many senior commanders who had changed sides twice in 
the space of twelve months. The esprit de corps was further weakened by a number changing 
sides during the campaign. However, Siborne is not concerned with the validity of this case. 
His objective is to convince the reader it was so, because if the reader accepts this point, then 
the British army that defeated it must be superior. This kind of analysis was consistent with 
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the memoirs of Henry Ross-Lewin. Final victory offered irrefutable evidence of British 
martial supremacy. Both appreciated that a positive characterisation of the French was critical 
because no victory is complete without it being won over a powerful and dangerous foe.  
 
Siborne’s decision to downplay the Prussians, denigrate the Dutch and Belgian troops and 
promote the French did not adversely impact his success, though whether it actually helped is 
debatable at best. Criticisms of his history still came from veterans and military sources, 
though the Prussians hardly featured.
23
 Some like Major Edward Macready, who served as an 
ensign at Waterloo, were driven by personal and regimental loyalty. Macready published a 
letter to Siborne in the United Service Magazine in 1845 hoping to address ‘errors’ he felt had 
denuded his regimental comrades of their rightful honours.
24
 However the overall public 
response, judging by contemporary reviews, was exceedingly positive. The Dublin University 
Magazine called it a ‘military classic’ and ‘a work which should at once and for ever settle 
the disputed questions of the campaigns’.25 Meanwhile the United Service Gazette had 
already described it as ‘likely to be as enduring as it is credible to his talents as a writer’, and 
The Times in 1845 referred to it as ‘a work so faithful and excellent’.26  
 
However, many reviews did note that Siborne ‘proves’ the success of the Duke was not 
owing to the ‘assistance of the Prussians’ but rather that ‘ultimate defeat of the enemy, fell 
exclusively upon the Anglo-allied army (minus the Dutch-Belgians)’.27 Some sources, who 
had previously accepted that the Prussian contribution had been significant, now believed that 
claims defending the original viewpoint stemmed from a ‘lack of knowledge, or from 
national vanity’.28 Others were not totally convinced of this argument. They felt that Siborne 
had gone too far and noted the Duke’s acknowledgement of the Prussian co-operation in 
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every particular had been ‘unvaried and uncompromising’.29 An observant American 
reviewer recognised that Siborne was denouncing the foreign contingents in order to magnify 
the exertions of Britain’s ‘fire-eating heroes’, but while astute, his observations were 
published in an American journal and read by few Britons.
30
 Siborne had validated the 
argument proffered by veterans that the Prussian involvement, at best, only exacerbated the 
disaster for the French, while the Dutch-Belgians were only injurious to the Allied cause.  
 
Though it would be difficult to determinate what impact, if any, these alterations had on 
Siborne’s success, his works did prove popular. The first edition, consisting of 1,000 copies, 
sold out prior to release, along with another 1,000 released as a second edition in the same 
year. An additional 1,500 copies were released with success in the United States.
31
 
Nonetheless, while enjoying this success, even in the Victorian period, 3,500 sales across 
Britain and the United States was hardly awe-inspiring. The main problem was that at over 
800 pages in two-volumes and priced at £2, 2s ($3.25 in the US), it was both written and 
priced for the aristocracy and wealthy middle-class.
32
 According to Siborne, he had intended 
to convert his text into a single-edition version at a reduced price for the mass market.  
 
Unbeknownst to him, he had a competitor for the mainstream history of Waterloo. George 
Gleig, the author of The Subaltern, had been a confidant of the Duke since the late 1820s and 
was aware of Wellington’s dissatisfaction with Siborne’s Waterloo Model.33 How much of 
the Duke’s disquiet encouraged Gleig is open to never-ending debate, but given the success 
of Siborne’s work, the conditions were certainly present for a successful mass-marketable 
history. Problematically for Gleig, he did not have access to Siborne’s source material, 
leaving him with little alternative but to exploit underdeveloped copyright laws to construct 
his narrative.  
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Released in 1847, Gleig’s 300 page Story of the Battle of Waterloo proved extremely popular 
with the British public.
34
 Priced at 6s, its popularity prevented Siborne from achieving much 
success with his own mass-marketable publication. Gleig’s association with the Duke of 
Wellington encouraged Peter Hofschröer to argue that Gleig stole Siborne’s work and altered 
it to glorify Wellington. This development met both the Duke’s demands for greater personal 
recognition and disestablished a significant Prussian contribution.
35
 Hofschröer’s attacks are 
misguided. As evidenced, Siborne had already significantly reduced the role of the Prussians. 
Additionally, Gleig made minimal changes to that particular discussion in his history. While 
Gleig has certainly had differences of opinion over technical issues, and his work is much 
shorter, his presentation is very consistent with Siborne.
36
 Much has been made of Gleig’s 
recurring eulogies to the Duke, but Siborne spent a whole page in his second chapter regaling 
how the Duke was ‘resolute, yet cool, cautious and calculating in his proceedings; possessing 
a natural courage unshaken even under the most appalling dangers and difficulties’.37  
 
Claims of marginalisation of the Prussians by Hofschröer are also difficult to substantiate 
when Gleig describes the Prussians as a ‘gallant people’ whose ‘courage that day was only to 
be equalled by their patience’.38 Statements such as ‘the Prussians forced their way’, ‘Blücher 
was true to his word’ and ‘Prussian regiments showed themselves at this critical juncture’ 
only act to further vindicate this supposition.
39
 Any reduction of the Prussian role reflected 
changes made by Siborne, not Gleig. The Prussians, along with Wellington’s German troops, 
are well regarded by Gleig.
40
 The British troops are also lauded with as much fervour as they 
were by Siborne, if a bit more subtly.
41
 Gleig even states that when the Dutch troops served 
alone, they were ‘as staunch and brave as they have uniformly proved themselves to be, both 
as the allies and the enemies of the British army’.42 Their efficiency, he theorises, was marred 
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by their ‘intermixture with Belgians’.43 The only substantial difference between Siborne and 
Gleig was this lone compliment to the Dutch troops, with their ‘lacklustre’ performance being 
attributed to the Belgians. Marginalisation of the Belgians was hardly a new concept. The 
notion that ‘Gleig saw to it that the masses read Wellington’s questionable version of the 
campaign’,44 put forward by Hofschröer, depends upon Siborne’s work being discernibly 
different. The only discernible difference is the length of the respective works.  
 
A closer analysis reveals that Siborne’s biggest problem was that he could not reconcile his 
ambitions with a small-scale project. Even when he published a mass-marketable version of 
his work in 1848, it was over 600 pages long and cost 20s. This is more than three times the 
price of Gleig’s work.45 A future commentator quite fairly described the work as ‘tedious’.46 
Gleig would have at least seven editions published in Britain and the United States by 1862. 
Siborne was not as favourably received. An inability to simplify his work had created issues 
with his model but Siborne failed to recognise the signs. In his desire to become the pre-
eminent scholar on the battle he overestimated public interest in the minutiae of the 
campaign. Conversely, denigrating foreign contingents seemed to have had little, if any, 
impact on his success or failure. There is simply insufficient evidence to suggest that the 
public were seriously concerned with that aspect of the campaign.  
 
The establishment of the similarity of the two works illustrates the influence Siborne’s work 
had on the Waterloo narrative in this period. Many veterans had shown a desire to distance 
the non-British contingents from any significant role in the success against the French, but 
Siborne’s work was the first secondary history that seriously engaged with this issue. The 
main challenge to the British narrative in Britain at this time came from the Prussians. 
Prussian military historians and their General Staff showed a willingness to challenge the 
British record of the campaign. Siborne’s original model, which displayed so many Prussians, 
was a result of the material they had provided him.
47
 And even as he was downplaying their 
role he still accepted any new material they provided, an action that has probably helped 
protect him from a more critical analysis of his depiction of the Prussians. The Prussians were 
not the only ones to challenge the record but works from the Netherlands and Belgium were 
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often ignored as they were not written in English. French claims were also quickly dismissed 
because they were the defeated party, a reality that many of their defenders struggled to 
accept. 
 
There is a discernible element of frustration amongst British veterans with the desire of 
foreign contingents to defend their role in the campaign. This encouraged some veterans to 
counter-argue the Prussians. Edward Cotton, a British cavalry sergeant at Waterloo, 
published a succinct narrative in 1849 that proved to be exceedingly popular with the public. 
Five editions were published by 1862. At around 150 pages Cotton was able to coordinate 
narrative and memoir in a more concise manner than either Siborne or Gleig. The work also 
had an afterword, consisting of his personal opinions on the battle, validated by his reputation 
as a Waterloo veteran. Naturally the Prussians featured heavily. Cotton took particular 
exception to the Prussians ‘taking the lion’s share in this glorious victory’, regarding it as ‘a 
peculiar bad grace’.48 While acknowledging the Prussian loss during their ‘short’ engagement 
‘proves the value of that cooperation’ and that their diversion ‘diminished the French force 
against us’,49 Cotton believes that ‘it is doubtful whether Napoleon could have driven the 
British from the ground, even if the Prussians had not arrived’.50 Cotton shows an 
unwillingness to acknowledge the importance of the fact that the Prussians had significantly 
reduced the French force against the ‘English troops’. He also ignores that British troops 
constituted only a third of Wellington’s army. For Cotton the ‘English troops had maintained 
their position for eight hours against the most experienced army and the ablest General ever 
France sent into the field’.51 This is both something he believed and felt the public needed to 
know.  
 
Despite the success of a number of these works, a shift in public attitudes to the role of war 
and national identity only becomes fully evident in the second half of the nineteenth-century 
as Britain responded to international developments. One of the most significant events was 
the outbreak of the Crimean War. While growing reconciliation between the army and the 
public could trace its origins in the Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars, the small colonial 
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wars that characterised the post-1815 period failed to resonate as strongly with the public.
52
 
In contrast, the Crimean conflict was a reaction to mutual suspicion that had developed in the 
1840s between Britain and Russia and garnered much press and public attention. In 1853, 
when Turkey declared war on Russia in order to prevent further Russian territorial gains at 
their expense, the British public endorsed the Turkish decision.
53
 While driven more by 
strategic considerations than public opinion, the decision to dispatch a Franco-British force to 
the Crimea in 1854 met with limited public condemnation.
54
  
 
The public reaction to the conflict was complex but one critical development was that the 
public awareness of the army markedly increased. This reflected the unprecedented manner 
in which reporting on the campaign was performed. The war saw a number of ingenuities, not 
least of which were the advent of war correspondents. William Howard Russell, operating for 
The Times, would make a name for himself in this capacity, taking advantage of fast 
steamships and a lack of censorship to expose the public to a national conflict, unparalleled 
both before and since.
55
 During the first year of the war several battles had seen heavy 
casualties, while the poor performance of medical, supply and transport arrangements saw 
this number needlessly escalate as cholera and other diseases afflicted the troops in the winter 
during the siege of Sevastopol.
56
 Russell and his fellow correspondents were highly critical of 
the organisational and strategic failures of the military. The power and reach of The Times 
ensured that this was read by hundreds of thousands of Britons. The government and military 
were aggrieved by Russell’s forthright observations but his words effected change. The 
establishment of The Times’ Fund ensured that essential services reached the army.57 The 
public were mortified by letters coming from Russell endorsing the same complaints that 
were being made by troops in letters home. Along with donations to the fund, many members 
of the public wrote letters to the editor offering their own expertise on all kinds of military 
matters.
58
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While senior commanders and the government were being reproached for command 
ineptitude, admiration for ordinary soldiers was unprecedented. Russell’s reports did show 
the trauma of the soldiers’ experience but were far more sanguine, and less critical, about 
their performance in battle. Russell was descriptive and emotive, and while happy to criticise 
senior commanders, lauded the British troops.
59
 The British servicemen helped themselves 
with their own letters, many of which their families published in the newspapers of the 
period. Their positive depictions were further assisted by the advent of battlefield 
photographers. This was the first major British war to incorporate photography. While 
pioneering, the technical constraints of the time meant that photographs could not capture the 
horrors of combat. This led to the war’s imagery helping to reinforce the existing correlation 
between heroism and war. Another new development that accentuated this idea was the 
awarding of medals for bravery for both officers and enlisted men, including the new and 
highly coveted Victoria Cross.
60
 Overall, tales of suffering as a result of government 
mismanagement drew, as Paris articulates, ‘a sympathetic humanitarian response from the 
public, while the guts-and-glory reports had an immediacy and excitement which powerfully 
reinforced ideas about the heroic nature of the rank and file’.61  
 
Ultimately the campaign ended in success in 1856, but the subsequent year witnessed the 
revolt of several sepoy regiments in India, which even led to their capture of Delhi. The 
Indian Mutiny, as it became known, was an almost guaranteed British victory from the outset, 
given both British technological superiority and the continuing loyalty of many Indian 
regiments. Despite this, the British press projected the conflict as a heroic struggle of an 
outnumbered force, and reported horrific atrocities perpetrated by the mutineers. Most were 
either fabricated or at least exaggerated but the public could not know this and it galvanised 
support.
62
  
 
The technological capabilities of the period enabled foreign wars to be increasingly 
accessible to the public, while still being sufficiently distant to detach the public from the 
realities of modern conflict. This enabled war to serve as a form of entertainment, and as 
Paris quite rightly argues, the ‘pleasure culture of war’ came into being in Britain at around 
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this point in time. Periodicals and newspapers were increasingly interested in the army and 
the motivation of the troops to serve.
63
 Representations of war to the public encouraged 
Britons to see themselves as either responsible for civilising the ‘other’ as they did in India, 
or stopping tyranny, which they did in the Crimea. The fact that the French did much of the 
fighting in the Crimea, or that the Indian Mutiny resulted from poor British treatment of the 
population, was largely ignored.
64
 The army’s senior command, consisting of the aristocracy 
and an expression of the class-based nature of British society, received sustained criticism 
from the public. Consequently, between 1868 and 1871 the Cardwell Reforms were 
introduced, which included removing the purchasing of commissions. Additionally, a cadre 
of reserves were created to improve the available quality and quantity of manpower.
65
 
Conditions for the ordinary soldier steadily improved, increasing the pool of men in Britain 
willing to join the army. Soldiers would continue to be kept at arm’s length by the public, but 
intriguingly the soldier began to epitomise masculinity in a manner that would have been 
impossible during the Napoleonic Wars. Even more than the burgeoning nationalist literature, 
these conflicts enabled Britons to view war as a pleasurable endeavour in which they as a 
nation were pre-eminent, and their wars as acceptable either in stopping tyranny or necessary 
to civilise the ‘other’. 
 
The acceptance of and appeal of war to the British public, and the essence of British martial 
supremacy, gained an additional dimension with the increasing application of ‘scientific’ 
constructs on military history. This application was part of a process that could be traced back 
to the eighteenth-century when the concept first gained support, resulting in the 
‘institutionalisation and professionalization of history as an academic subject’.66 With respect 
to Waterloo, this became a real focus following the 1862 publication of George Hooper’s 
Waterloo: The Downfall of the First Napoleon.
67
 While the 1850s saw several new editions 
of Gleig and Cotton’s work being published, as well as Kincaid and Siborne’s works being 
sold, there was a decline after 1862. Hooper’s work was similar in style to Gleig and Cotton, 
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though he seemingly does not rate their works, as he intended his history to present a quality 
single volume without ‘all the minute details’ and military ‘character’ of Siborne’s work, 
something they had already seemingly done.
68
  
 
Hooper was followed in 1865 by a posthumous publication of a short analysis of the 
campaign from Waterloo veteran James Shaw Kennedy.
69
 While neither were professional 
historians operating within an institution, both were conscious of the increasing acceptance of 
this method, or at least creating the impression of its application. Hooper, in his work, 
outlines his ‘recourse to the best authorities in English, French, German and Dutch’, with 
which he ‘endeavoured to produce a complete and accurate work’.70 Meanwhile Shaw 
Kennedy highlighted not only his military record, as ‘circumstances of the action brought me 
into personal contact, during its progress’, with a number of Allied senior commanders, but 
that he had consulted all ‘published accounts’ then available, ‘deriving from them such views 
and facts as seem legitimate’.71 While, in theory, the application of a scientific methodology 
to history should have improved the quality of the history being produced, many historians, 
particularly Stefan Berger, have noted that it often acted to strengthen myths that had been 
crucial ‘in formulating ideas about national character’ prior to the emergence of ‘scientific 
history’.72 
 
Despite the strong intimation that they were constructing a ‘scientific’ history, both Hooper 
and Shaw Kennedy were more concerned with attributing victory to the British army. While 
preceding works had regularly lauded the British and K.G.L. troops, Hooper and Shaw 
Kennedy went further. Both eliminated any discernible contribution from other contingents, 
not just the Dutch-Belgians. Although sometimes simply inaccurate, Hooper often just 
downplays or ignores any involvement of the non-British troops. The higher percentage of 
casualties for the British and K.G.L. troops is regularly employed as justification. This 
interpretation ignores many alternative reasons for disparate casualty counts.
73
 Similarly, 
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though in a more direct manner, Shaw Kennedy denounces the allied troops. At the 
commencement of his work he discerns that the non-British or K.G.L troops of Wellington’s 
army, nearly 40,000 troops, possessed the same martial qualities as that of 11,000 British 
troops. Consequently, Shaw Kennedy reduces Wellington’s army to that of approximately 
41,000 British-equivalent troops. He provides no evidence for this beyond his reputation as a 
Waterloo veteran. Seemingly these troops are so incompetent that four of them were worth 
only one British soldier. The French commitment to deal with the Prussians is also reduced to 
enlarge the reciprocal force facing the British position. By his estimation, 61,000 French 
troops faced 41,000 British equivalent troops from 11:30am to 6pm.
74
 He also establishes at 
the outset of his work that he will focus specifically on Waterloo, thereby neatly avoiding the 
Prussian detachment that successfully prevented the 33,000 French under Grouchy from 
reinforcing Napoleon. Shaw Kennedy has quite effectively created parameters that prejudice 
the view he intends to present and utilised the word ‘science’ to justify his position.  
 
‘Scientific’ constructs were not exploited by all contemporary writers and historians of 
military history to present their own nation as militarily pre-eminent. Charles Chesney, a 
colonel and official military historian, aptly observed in his Waterloo Lectures, 
‘succeeding authors think they are doing their country service by shutting their  
eyes to the truth, and following blindly the narratives of their own party, thus 
accepting for history a purely onesided version of events. By and by the  
stereotyped statement is treated as fact, its accuracy hotly defended, records  
diligently searched in as far as they are likely to confirm it. This process,  
continued on either side, multiplies contradiction, until essayists moralise over 
the falsity of history, forgetful that in all disputes truth can only be sifted out by 
comparing evidence, and that it is the special duty of the judge to correct that 
partiality of witnesses which obscures but does not change the nature of the facts.’75 
This is an astute observation and Chesney constructs, arguably, the most objective history of 
Waterloo to come out of Britain in the nineteenth-century.  
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Chesney’s Waterloo Lectures proves more adept at integrating source material from all the 
national contingents. However, he does still tend to favour British sources. This reflects both 
his acquisition of more British sources and that, except for a couple of Prussian memoirs, his 
primary source material all came from British veterans. As a result, he accepts claims from 
these sources because, as he often argues, there is more material supporting them. It is not 
clear whether he realised that much of the non-British secondary sources he uses were 
constructed from the memories or battle reports from participants. Either way, it must be 
remembered that it was far more difficult to obtain large amounts of material in the 
nineteenth-century. Ultimately, his biggest mistake appears in the introduction when he 
undermines his objective to not accept ‘a purely onesided version of events’. In it he declares 
Hooper’s work as ‘one of the best single volumes on this campaign existing in any 
language’,76 and Shaw Kennedy as being in possession of ‘the faculty of judicial criticism, 
which makes history valuable’.77 As already evidenced this is not the case and by saying 
otherwise, Chesney has endorsed works that project national aggrandisement and use 
‘science’ to justify their claims, something he is opposed too.   
 
By the start of the 1870s the ‘pleasure culture of war’ had become well-established in Britain 
as had the nationalistic memory of Waterloo. This period also marked a fundamental shift in 
European power politics, as the disparate German states finally formed a complete German 
state with Prussia as the main power. The formation followed the end of the highly 
successful, though costly, campaign against the French which saw the removal of Napoleon 
III.
78
 The Austrians were left out of the new German state, but Central Europe enjoyed an 
unprecedented position of power. Initially, this did not concern the British because the new 
German state could offset Russian ambitions, as France has previously done.
79
 This would 
quickly change as German ambitions desired international expansion, which led to them 
increasingly impinging upon British colonial interests.  
 
The Anglo-German relationship deteriorated over the last part of the nineteenth and early 
twentieth-centuries as Britain tried to maintain global pre-eminence from the rising power of 
Germany. The competition for colonies intensified as both competed for islands in the Pacific 
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and became involved with the rest of Europe in the ‘Scramble for Africa’. This dynamic was 
more complicated than a simple decline in relations that eventually led to war. Both nations 
feared the implications of an alliance between France and Russia, leaving many conservatives 
in the 1890s to regard Germany as a ‘natural ally’.80 In this period France and Russia were as 
equally likely as Germany to appear as the national antagonist in the fictional military 
literature that was being popularly written and read in Britain.
81
 But both nations’ desire for 
pre-eminence ensured that this potential partnership would never develop. 
 
From a military standpoint, a major area of contention centred over Germany’s naval 
expansion. This problem escalated following the ascension of Kaiser Wilhelm II. Germany 
maintained a large conscript army, like the other Continental European powers, and this force 
continued to grow as France and Russia became friendlier, which, in a dangerous and obvious 
circle, was precipitated by rising German power. But the expansion of the navy was seen as 
both a direct challenge and a threat to Britain, as well as unnecessary, due to their already 
powerful army.
82
 This triggered a naval arms race between the two countries, leading to the 
development and production of dreadnoughts and even aircraft carriers. Furthermore, Britain 
was left humiliated by the difficulty it had in overwhelming the Boers in the turn of the 
century conflict in South Africa. This European enemy, fighting with revolutionary 
‘kommando’ tactics, forced Britain to deploy half a million men (including colonial and 
mercenary formations) to deal with an enemy force that never exceeded 30,000 men.
83
 
Humiliation was further exacerbated by concern over the substantial number of British 
volunteers who failed to pass the then primitive medical requirements. This threatened the 
capacity of the nation to deal with any future, more direct, threat, whether it came from 
France, Russia or the growing power of Germany.
84
   
 
British governments recognised the need to improve the living standards of the working class 
to create a powerful enough force to stop its potential future opponents, though it would take 
time for this to come into effect. The government also decided that it needed to become 
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involved in the alliance system that characterised international relations in Europe at this 
time. In the late nineteenth-century Britain had persevered with their policy of ‘splendid 
isolation’, but the new century, the continuing rise of Germany and the problems encountered 
in South Africa had encouraged a change in policy.
85
 The first alliance was actually signed 
with Japan in 1902 and in 1904 a non-binding agreement, or Entente, was signed with France. 
In 1907, this was expanded to include Russia, leading to the creation of the Triple Entente. 
The Entente was non-binding and did not precipitate British involvement in 1914, their 
reasoning and motivation being far more complex, but its signing showed a shift in Britain’s 
view on international relations.  
 
The other major development, which was not government-orchestrated, was the increase in 
fictional literature depicting heroic British victories in future conflicts. Steve Attridge argues 
that this was driven by the desire to escape from the realities of the situation, specifically the 
military crisis in the first year of the Boer War.
86
 But the reasoning for this development is 
more complicated because it occurred over such an extended period. As I. F. Clarke notes, 
the first real example of this new genre was George Tomkyns Chesney’s 1871 work The 
Battle of Dorking. In this fictional futuristic work, the new state of Germany was the enemy, 
and the British were actually defeated. Chesney was motivated by the desire to institute 
reform for the British army, but fictional military literature, of a more optimistic nature, 
developed as a result.
87
 In its wake an entire industry centred on war developed, one that 
particularly targeted the male youth of the country, an obvious choice given that they would 
be the potential future recruits.
88
 The glorification of British arms and heroic national war in 
fictional literature was also carried over into actual history, a common theme in Europe. As 
Hobsbawm argues, the invention of traditions occurred with a ‘particular assiduity in the 
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thirty or forty years before the first world war’.89 But in relation to Waterloo, it went beyond 
simply writing false history.  
 
In 1891, Herbert Siborne, the son of William, published approximately half of the letters his 
father had received from veterans of the Waterloo campaign.
90
 Despite his father receiving 
numerous letters from officers of the German states none were included in the release. This 
created an even more prejudicial view of the campaign. Glover quite rightly notes at ‘the time 
in which he was publishing, Victorian Britain demanded to read of a British victory and 
nothing else’.91 But the implications are more significant. The British public was not just 
reading of a victory, writers and historians were actually disclosing or hiding evidence to 
support a nationalist interpretation. Scientific history was being used to strengthen a myth 
crucial to ideas about national character. 
 
The Waterloo myth was also vigorously defended when it was challenged, irrespective of 
whether that challenge was launched domestically or abroad. In May 1900, Briton Demetrius 
Boulger published an article, The Belgians at Waterloo, in the British periodical The 
Contemporary Review.
92
 For this article, Boulger was granted access to numerous after-battle 
reports from the high-ranking officers of the Netherlands army of 1815, allowing him to 
challenge the by now well-accepted British narrative. The reasoning for constructing a new 
history was not purely driven by a desire for revisionism. Boulger was actually in the employ 
of King Leopold II of Belgium, who was attempting to reverse the negative press he was 
receiving in Britain for his brutal regime in the Congo.
93
 Despite questionable motives, his 
work had merit, precipitating a conversation on the British memory of the conflict. Boulger 
was followed by countryman Sir Herbert Maxwell, whose work provided further vindication 
of the performance of the Dutch-Belgian troops. Maxwell also made the pertinent point, 
quoted in the introduction, regarding the fact that the vast majority of the British population 
saw Waterloo as a ‘triumph of British strategy and valour’ and the foreign contingents, if 
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mentioned, were either ‘merely subsidiary’ or played ‘an injurious part’.94 While both men 
disagreed with one another over minor points, both were willing to challenge a consolidated 
historical judgement about the performance of one of Britain’s allies. 
 
These articles did not go unnoticed and earned a stinging rebuke from one of the premier 
military historians of the period, Sir Charles Oman. Oman, who would later compile a multi-
volume history of the Peninsular War, was mystified at the claims that both Boulger, and 
even more so, Maxwell, were suddenly making. Oman, citing as he says, the ‘best eye-
witnesses of 1815, and of the official statistics vouchsafed by the Dutch-Belgian 
Government’, rejected all Maxwell’s conclusions.95 Oman interpreted, or some might say 
exploited, the Dutch-Belgian sources which differentiated between casualties and missing, 
concluding that the high figures that some Netherlander units had in missing men resulted 
from cowards abandoning the battlefield.
96
 Boulger published an expanded thesis of his 
article in response to Oman, including translations of after-battle reports from various 
Netherlander officers. His work highlighted the variety of other reasons that would result in 
men being declared missing from units such as prisoners and cavalrymen who had had their 
horse shot from under them. He further noted the statistics of various British formations who 
highly distinguished themselves at the battle. The 2
nd
 Life Guards, an English Regiment, 
recorded 17 dead, 41 wounded and 97 missing.
97
 However, in light of the times and the 
strength of the narrative in British collective memory, little impact was made by these 
revisionist works.  
 
While the Dutch and Belgian case was being argued by Britons and neither nation threatened 
Britain militarily, the Kaiser offended many when speaking of Waterloo in 1903. At a 
celebration in Hanover marking the 100
th
 anniversary of the formation of the King’s German 
Legion, the Kaiser remarked ‘the Germans had rescued the British army from destruction at 
Waterloo’.98 As has been seen throughout the last two chapters, this was a contentious issue 
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between the two nations, and little had changed. The comment earned the ire of the British 
public and press and a number of articles were published in periodicals debating the veracity 
of the comment. Naturally, they were contemptuous of the Kaiser’s comment with one 
British writer even offering a counterview theorising that while ‘it is untrue to say the 
Prussians saved the English army from destruction, it is nothing but the most sober truth to 
affirm that the steadfastness of the British infantry in resisting the attacks of Napoleon saved 
the Prussian army from annihilation’.99 This is the problem with the entire premise of 
according responsibility for victory to one ally over another, one can only mitigate risk in war 
not remove it. During the 1815 campaign both allied armies were forced to take chances and 
risk their own destruction to destroy Napoleon. However for both nations, rational 
observations were superseded by the needs of national aggrandisement.  
 
The advent of war correspondents during the Crimean War in the middle of the nineteenth-
century was a critical component in the development of a ‘pleasure culture of war’ in Britain. 
The manner in which they projected the campaign, and those that followed, allowed Britons 
to view their conflicts as both entertaining, as well as necessary either to stop tyranny or 
spread the benefits of ‘civilisation’. This ‘pleasure culture’ was not a sudden shift but built on 
the strong foundation of interest in war that could be traced back to the eighteenth-century. It 
was at this time that the memory of Waterloo, as it was constructed by the veterans of the 
campaign, achieved greater public acceptance. While writers such as Siborne and Gleig had 
proven comfortable with exalting the British army, they were generally reluctant to denigrate 
the non-British contingents, with the exception of Siborne’s assaults on the Dutch-Belgians. 
But attitudes hardened and the works that were released after the Crimean War and Indian 
Mutiny embraced the argument put forward thirty years earlier. These works further utilised 
‘scientific’ history, in contrast to its intended assertions, to strengthen pro-British sentiments. 
Their broad reach and successes had more significant consequences in that they extended the 
‘other’ from France, in which eighteenth-century Britons saw themselves in opposition too 
and superior than, to including anything that was not British. As militarism gripped Europe at 
the end of the nineteenth-century, in the lead-up to the First World War, these histories were 
used to validate ideas about national character and any challenge against them was vigorously 
defended. By the outbreak of war in 1914, Waterloo had become a classic British military 
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epic in the public memory and Britain saw itself as both different and superior to its European 
rivals.   
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Conclusion 
 
The militarism of British national identity that existed in the latter half of the nineteenth-
century has been seen by historians as a separate phenomenon to that which was formed in 
the crucible of war in the ‘long-eighteenth-century’. This earlier national identity, as 
described by Colley, was an artificial construct that was moulded around recurrent war with 
an easily discernible ‘other’ in the form of France.1 This is in contrast to the robust militarism 
of the late nineteenth-century, which saw Britain establish an identity in opposition to 
anything foreign. Michael Paris’ Warrior Nation has shown that this militaristic national 
identity has an earlier history, tracing this influence back to the mid-nineteenth-century, when 
a ‘pleasure culture of war’ was fashioned in Britain.2 But these constructs are still seen as 
detached from one another, with the post-Waterloo period up to the mid-century Crimean 
War being seen as a period marked by war-weariness and a lack of enthusiasm for conflict. 
Rather, this period is viewed as a time of domestic upheaval in which Britons, buoyed by 
wartime demands in the conflict against Napoleon, pushed for changes to the political system 
to allow greater access to the vote.     
 
The publication of Neil Ramsey’s work on military memoirs assists, somewhat inadvertently, 
in linking the national identity of the two periods.
3
 His thesis shows that by 1823, only eight 
years after Waterloo, the military memoir established itself as a successful literary genre in 
Britain. Furthermore, they show that the public, rather than embracing the melancholy of the 
majority of veterans’ memoirs, proved far more receptive to those that, in essence, glorified 
their wartime experiences. John Kincaid achieved even more success with his projection of a 
‘cheerful stoicism’ that saw him discuss his experiences in an almost light-heartened manner, 
even if they were exceedingly graphic.
4
 The success of these works demonstrates that for a 
war-weary population, the public had a continuing interest in war, and more specifically its 
glorification, a theme that would be consistent with views later in the century. There was 
certainly an element of war-weariness among the population, particularly those that endured 
hardships such as the many veterans who wrote melancholic memoirs. But for the majority of 
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the population, no doubt reflecting the fact that they, as a nation, had been victorious, war 
held a grandiose romantic appeal that would only expand over the course of the nineteenth-
century. 
 
Gavin Daly’s work on British soldiers in the Peninsula adds further to this argument because 
it illustrates that British soldiers’ identity was markedly different from the population on the 
home front.
5
 France remained the most obvious enemy for the public at home, as they were 
the nation that threatened invasion. But identity develops from experience and British troops 
in the Peninsula experienced the war from a very different perspective than their civilian 
counterparts. While a healthy respect developed between British and French soldiers, this did 
not transfer over to the Portuguese and Spanish soldiers, or their civilian populations. The 
Spanish and Portuguese were seen as the ‘other’, they were vastly different, far more 
different than the French, and that, consequently, made them inferior.  
 
While more Britons served in the Peninsula, and wrote about their experiences, Waterloo 
resonated more with the public, as the campaign marked the end of the wars and also saw the 
British army involved in the defeat of Napoleon and his removal from power. The prejudice 
felt by British soldiers in the Peninsula carried on through to the Waterloo campaign, where 
the situation was made worse by the fact that many of their allies had previously served under 
Napoleon in the Peninsula against the British. Questions of loyalty were added to perceptions 
of inferiority. The memoirs clearly show that many veterans were aggrieved at the allied 
contingents for their perceived immaterial contributions, along with their claiming of credit 
for the success of the campaign. Earlier memoirs proved comfortable simply relating 
episodes of the campaign with casual denigration of the non-British formations, as if it was 
well accepted by the public. But the level of vitriol escalated as time progressed and veterans 
took greater care to justify their animosity. This bellicose attitude was strongly endorsed by 
the Siborne Letters, the letters procured by William Siborne in order to create his model, 
which provide overwhelming evidence that these opinions were not isolated but rampant 
amongst the British servicemen in that campaign. 
 
Nonetheless, there was not an immediate transference of this animosity from the veterans to 
the general public. There is a general perception amongst Waterloo historians and writers that 
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the British public, by the late 1830s, had embraced the nationalistic history of Waterloo, but 
this conclusion seems to be based on perception rather than evidence. While the public 
enjoyed the memoirs and engaged with the concept of ‘cheerful stoicism’, available evidence 
suggests that for most Britons there was a willingness to acknowledge the non-British 
contingents, particularly the Prussians. Undoubtedly some of this misplaced perception 
comes from the financial failure of William Siborne. His model made insufficient profit to 
repay his outlays and he became convinced this was a result of his model being insufficiently 
British, due to its acknowledgement of the Prussians. As a result, Siborne scaled down the 
significance of the Prussians to accentuate the British.
6
 Despite his efforts, he was still no 
more financially successful, while his competitors enjoyed great success.  
 
The great divide between the public’s reception towards Siborne and his literary competitors, 
particularly George Gleig, has led most to assume Siborne’s lack of appeal stemmed from his 
more balanced portrait of events.
7
 But an objective analysis of Siborne and Gleig shows that 
Siborne is more preoccupied with themes of Britishness than Gleig. Siborne’s glorification of 
British arms is more evocative and less subtle than Gleig, and Siborne was responsible for the 
downgrading of the Prussian contribution and the dismissal of the Dutch-Belgians. Gleig has 
taken on board these points but has not argued them as vociferously as Siborne. Gleig was 
also not the only one who enjoyed success in this period with his history of the campaign. 
Waterloo veteran Edward Cotton was also immensely popular, and his work was more 
aggressive with themes of Britishness than either work.
8
 Ultimately, it was the exceedingly 
complexity and depth of Siborne’s work, rather than the level of Britishness, that inhibited his 
success. Even when he released a mass-marketable work, it was 600 pages long and cost 20s, 
making it uncompetitive with other works at the time.  
 
By the middle of the century Waterloo was a popular reference point for British national 
identity, demonstrating that war continued to be a popular theme in its development after 
1815. However, the success or failure of a number of works had shown that ‘foreigner 
bashing’ was not a prerequisite for success. Certainly the veterans of Waterloo, along with 
their brethren in the Peninsula, had conceptualised their allies as the ‘other’ and, 
consequently, inferior, but this had not been overwhelming embraced by the population. The 
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catalyst for a shift in the population identifying themselves in opposition to all, not just the 
French, can be seen with the outbreak of the Crimean War. This conflict, followed so soon 
after by the Indian Mutiny, and being the first British conflict reported by war 
correspondents, helped to solidify the positive relationship that had developed between the 
public and the army, dating back to the Revolutionary and Napoleonic wars. While 
correspondents were prompt in criticising the army’s organisational and command structure, 
they were also swift in prodigiously recognising the qualities and performance of the ordinary 
fighting soldier. The Indian Mutiny added the additional element of civilising the ‘other’ and 
from that point on British conflicts were almost uniformly portrayed either as attempting to 
stop tyranny and oppression, or civilise the less developed for their own benefit.  
 
The prejudice evident in the memoirs was not the reason that the ‘other’ in Britain shifted 
from the French to essentially anything foreign. But once this viewpoint began to develop in 
the country the memoirs were used to re-present the Waterloo narrative. These changing 
attitudes of the British public coincided with the development of ‘scientific’ constructs for the 
study of history in Germany. Theoretically designed to improve the overall quality and 
accuracy of the discipline, the methods were readily adopted internationally. But in the era of 
nationalism, writers and historians, as Stefan Berger has shown, utilised them to argue their 
own nation’s cause, whatever that might be.9 For Britons in this period, there was a desire to 
project martial pre-eminence and one of the most effective ways to do this was to reference 
the success of past conflicts. This was made easier in new Waterloo histories because it 
simply meant recycling the case put forward in memoirs and William Siborne’s history. 
Historiographical problems with these works were poorly understood by contemporaries, 
allowing veterans’ prejudices to influence public memory. The manner in which the non-
British contingents were portrayed was increasingly dismissive and denigrating, and the 
memory of Waterloo shifted from an allied victory to that of a British victory over an old 
enemy. Animosities leading up to the First World War only accentuated this development.  
Attempts to redress the narrative were vigorously challenged by historians at the time until 
the nationalistic narrative became established fact in the minds of both the British public and 
the British historians of Waterloo.  
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